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JURISDICTION

This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has Jurisdiction to decide
appellants' appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it granted Smith's motion for summary

judgment?
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a
matter of law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's
legal conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness,
without according deference to the trial court." Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah
App. 1994) (citations omitted).
2.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it ordered, as a matter of law, the ASC

Utah, Inc. funds that had been attached pursuant to a writ of garnishment issued on the
original, reversed judgment, released to Smith?
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is granted as a
matter of law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's
legal conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for correctness,
without according deference to the trial court." Id.
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH R. CIV.

P. 56, Summary judgment. See Addendum 2.

UTAH R. CIV.

P. 64D(i), Garnishment. See Addendum 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

The issue of the validity of a 1966 contract between D. A. Osguthorpe and the
decedent, Enoch Smith, Jr., was resolved in Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App. 361, U
32, 58 P.3d 854 (hereinafter "Smith /"), in which this Court affirmed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment that the 1966 agreement between Plaintiffs decedent, Enoch
Smith, Jr., and defendant, D. A. Osguthorpe, was valid, and applicable to the proceeds
of any agreements to sell or lease certain real property owned by D. A. Osguthorpe, or
his successors. See id., U 53, 58 P.3d at 865. This Court reversed the trial court's
summary judgment on damages, however. See id. This Court remanded for a
determination, of whether an agreement between ASC Utah, Inc., on the one hand, and
the defendants and non-party Stephen A. Osguthorpe, on the other hand, for the use of
a portion of the real property and provision of personal services was intended by the
parties to be integrated. See id.fl45, 58 P.3d at 863-64. This Court stated: "We
therefore remand for the court to consider the parol evidence or to make clear that it
considered the parol evidence in ruling that the lease and the amendments are
integrated." id.
On remand, Plaintiff Enoch Richard Smith (hereinafter "Smith"), the personal
representative of the estate of Enoch Smith, Jr., immediately renewed his motion for
summary judgment, without supporting the motion with any statement of facts,
supported by citation to the record. See Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March
29, 2003 (R. 1131-1134); Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;
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(R. 1135-1146); Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 1149-1169). The trial court granted summary judgment on damages on
the renewed motion, based strictly on the trial court's statement that it had previously
considered parol evidence and, without any new evidence, dramatically increased the
judgment.
Defendants moved under Rule 54(b) to revisit or clarify the Memorandum
Decision (Motion, R. 1209-10, Memorandum in Support, R. 1211-21), in part based on
the argument that this Court must have intended in its remand to follow the Utah
Supreme Court's admonition in the case of Platts v. Parents Helping Parents dba
Turnabout, 947 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1997), that a remand to the trial court on an
unclear summary judgment record should require "the trial court to set out an adequate
basis of undisputed facts to justify its grant of summary judgment or, if necessary, to
hold further proceedings to make adequate factual determinations." Id. The trial court
denied that motion and refused to explain what undisputed facts existed on which it
could base a summary judgment, especially one that is several hundred thousand
dollars higher than the original judgment.
Further, the trial court held over $200,000.00 that had been attached pursuant to
a writ of garnishment issued upon the original judgment that this Court reversed.
Rather than release those funds upon this Court's reversal to ASC Utah, Inc., the
garnishee, and without any writ issued on the second judgment or proceedings thereon,
the trial court purported to resolve disputed factual issues as a matter of law and
ordered the funds paid to Smith.
This appeal therefore challenges the correctness of the entry of summary
3

judgment on damages, as well as the correctness of the garnishee order that the funds
held by the court upon the writ of garnishment issued on the first judgment that was
reversed, be released to Smith.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Following the original judgment herein entered by the trial court, a writ of
garnishment was issued to ASC Utah, Inc., and, in the course of garnishment
proceedings upon that writ, $200,000 was paid into the court. Before final action was
taken to release those funds from the trial court, this Court reversed the original
judgment with respect to damages and remanded for further proceedings.
C.

Disposition By Trial Court.

Smith filed a motion for summary judgment upon remand. The trial court again
granted summary judgment for Smith (increasing the damages award by several
hundred thousand dollars over the original judgment, without receiving any evidence)
and, without a writ issued on such second judgment, or other process to determine
ownership of the previously attached funds, ordered them released to Smith on the
same day that it entered the second summary judgment on damages. This appeal from
the post-remand summary judgment and the final order on the garnishment issued
under the first, reversed, judgment ensued.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Prior to 1959, D. A. Osguthorpe, individually, operated a sheep and cattle

business. As part of that business, D. A. Osguthorpe was the owner of and grazed his
sheep and cattle over real property, part of which is the subject of this action. June 21,
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1999 Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe at H 2 (R. 116); April 21, 2000 Affidavit of D. A.
Osguthorpe atfl 1 (R. 258).
2.

In approximately 1959, Enoch Smith, Jr.1 and D. A. Osguthorpe formed a

partnership, by oral agreement, for the purpose of operating a sheep and cattle
business (the "Oral Partnership"). Id. atfl 3 (R. 117).
3.

Prior to the formation of the Oral Partnership, D. A. Osguthorpe owned

fee title to all of the subject real estate. Id. at H 4 (R. 117).
4.

Subsequent to D. A. Osguthorpe's payment of $50,000.00 cash to Smith

for Smith's partnership interest, D. A. Osguthorpe was informed by O. W. Moyle, Jr. of
the law firm of Moyle & Draper, that Smith desired that D. A. Osguthorpe sign a
document to memorialize the agreement relating to the dissolution of the Oral
Partnership pursuant to the Oral Dissolution Agreement. At that time, Mr. Moyle
presented D. A. Osguthorpe with a draft copy of a document (the "1966 Document"). D.
A. Osguthorpe was informed by Mr. Moyle that the 1966 Document had been drafted
by Mr. Moyle at the request of Smith. June 21,1999 Affidavit of D. A. Osguthorpe at fl
6 (R. 117-118). This Court previously held the 1966 Document to be a valid and
enforceable dissolution agreement in Smith I.
5.

Some thirty years following the dissolution agreement, in 1996, Ken

Griswold, the manager of Wolf Mountain Resort, contacted D. A. Osguthorpe about
entering into an agreement by which D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe would
(1) help Wolf Mountain get approval and permits from Summit County , and
1

"Smith," as used herein, refers to both decedent and, where the context
requires, his personal representative.
5

concessions from adjoining landowners; (2) help in dealings with the County
Commissioners, the zoning and planning commissions; and D. A. Osguthorpe would (3)
allow the use of a part of the high country land owned by D. A. Osguthorpe and D. A.
Osguthorpe Family Partnership, for limited purposes at limited times of year. See
Deposition of D. A. Osguthorpe at 68:5-72:15 (R. 959). Wolf Mountain Resort
specifically was interested in exploiting the rapport that the Osguthorpes, and
particularly Stephen Osguthorpe, had with various government officials and community
leaders who could be helpful to the resort. See Deposition of D. A. Osguthorpe at
73:12 - 82:24 (R. 959).
6.

An agreement was negotiated between Wolf Mountain Resort, D. A.

Osguthorpe, The D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership and Stephen Osguthorpe,
requiring an annual pre-payment of $100,000 to keep the Osguthorpes on retainer to
deal on behalf of Wolf Mountain with county officers and land owners, requiring
Stephen Osguthorpe to provide advice and other services, and requiring D. A.
Osguthorpe to allow the use of a small portion of his land at times, for part of a ski run
and for lift towers. Id. A document was executed memorializing that small part of the
entire agreement that dealt with the use of the land, strictly to allow Wolf Mountain
Resort to record its limited property rights that resulted from that agreement. See
Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, ffi| 3-4 (R. 750). Stephen Osguthorpe, individually,
was a party to the entire agreement, but did not sign the written document concerning
the real estate because he was not an owner of the real estate. Id.

It was not

intended either by any of the Osguthorpe parties or Wolf Mountain that the document
would be an integration and, indeed, the document, which consists of approximately
6

one-half page describing the property involved, together with a drawing as an exhibit,
contains no integration clause. Id. and Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Stephen
Osguthorpe (R. 755-56).
7.

Wolf Mountain Resort was subsequently purchased by ASC Utah, Inc., in

July 1997. See Affidavit of Blaise Carrig at 1J 2 (R. 762). Mr. Blaise Carrig was the
managing director of ASC Utah as of July 3, 1997, when it took over the resort, and was
the president of ASC Utah, Inc. from 1999 through all material times in this litigation. Id.
at H1 (R. 761).
8.

When ASC Utah, Inc. took over Wolf Mountain Resorts, it acquired all of

Wolf Mountain's rights and obligations under the agreement between Wolf Mountain
and the Osguthorpes. See Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, at U 3 (R. 762). ASC Utah, Inc.
understood that the agreement included an obligation for it to pre-pay $100,000 each
year for future personal services rendered by D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen
Osguthorpe "which were critical to the success of the master planning and permit
approval process for The Canyons." Id. at U 4 (R. 762).
9.

On July 28, 1997, Les Otten, the then-president of American Skiing

Company, the parent company of ASC Utah, Inc., and Blaise Carrig, met with D. A.
Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe in a sheep meadow to discuss modifications to
the original Wolf Mountain agreement. See id. at H 5 (R. 762-63).
10.

ASC Utah, Inc. specifically asked Stephen Osguthorpe, individually, to

continue to assist it with the approval process for its expansion and to provide day-today consultation on land use, planning and environmental issues, as well as to allow it

7

to utilize Stephen Osguthorpe's community and political rapport for the agreement's
entire term. See id. On that date, ASC Utah, Inc. agreed to increase the annual prepayment to $150,000 in recognition of additional services it was requesting, as well as
the expanded use of real property. See id.
11.

At the conclusion of that negotiation in the sheep meadow, Mr. Carrig

drafted an amendment to the original agreement, attached to his affidavit as Exhibit B,
which, again, contained no integration clause and which expressly named Stephen A.
Osguthorpe as a party. (R. 769-770).
12.

The requirement that the Osguthorpes, and particularly Stephen

Osguthorpe, be on retainer to provide such requested services to allow exploitation of
his rapport with government and community leaders and neighbors, to the exclusive
benefit of ASC Utah, Inc., was to last twenty-eight years. See Deposition of Blaine
Carrig, at 45:17 - 48:25 (R. 958). See also Deposition of D. A. Osguthorpe, at 81:8 82:24; 92:20-25 (R. 959).
13.

Because of the time constraints and the unique nature of ASC Utah, Inc.'s

relationship with the Osguthorpes, the amendment drafted by Mr. Carrig was very brief
and did not include a detailed description of all of the personal services to be provided
by the Osguthorpes in consideration for the annual pre-payment of $150,000. Instead it
referred to the parties' obligations (including the obligation of Stephen Osguthorpe) to
work together in good faith and maintain open communication. ASC Utah, Inc. never
intended the amendment to be a complete recitation of all the services to be provided
by Stephen Osguthorpe in consideration for the annual pre-payment. See Affidavit of
Blaise Carrig at U 6 (R. 763).
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14.

A further amendment was drafted by Mr. Carrig after a meeting with D. A.

Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe, and signed August 10,1998, again with no
integration clause. See Affidavit of Blaise Carrig at H 7 (R. 763-64, 771-72).
15.

Once Mr. Carrig began negotiating the amendments on behalf of ASC

Utah, Inc., Stephen Osguthorpe was specifically included as a signing party on the
agreements. See Exhibits B and C to the Affidavit of Blaise Carrig (R. 769-72).
16.

On May 13,1998, D. A. Osguthorpe signed a Special Warranty Deed to

transfer the property at issue (and more) to D. A. Osguthorpe, Trustee of the Dr. D. A.
Osguthorpe Trust, which deed was delivered and recorded August 20, 1998 in the
office of the Summit County Recorder (R. 544-546).
17.

This action was filed two and one-half months subsequent to that

transfer, on November 6, 1998, yet does not name as a defendant D. A. Osguthorpe in
his capacity as Trustee of the Dr. D. A. Osguthorpe Family Trust, even though the
Trust, as of August 20, 1998, became entitled to any portion of the 1999 pre-payment
for use of its real estate. See Complaint (R. 1-14). The Complaint also fails to name
Stephen A. Osguthorpe or ASC Utah, Inc., even though Smith has sought to interpret
their rights and obligations under the Agreement. See id.
18.

The original agreement between Wolf Mountain, D. A. Osguthorpe,

Osguthorpe Family Partnership and Stephen Osguthorpe, and as later amended by
ASC Utah, Inc., was intended by each of the parties thereto to provide a single annual
pre-payment in exchange both for the use of real property and the provision of services
to Wolf Mountain and, later, ASC Utah. Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, at U 4 (R. 762). The
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Osguthorpes in fact performed each year by providing services in exchange for the
annual payment. See Deposition of Blaise Carrig at 17:25 - 22:22 (R. 958).
19.

In fact, the agreement to increase the amount of compensation under the

agreements was specifically made, in part, largely due to the agreement to provide
additional services. Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, at ffll 5-7 (R. 762-63).
20.

ASC Utah never intended the written documents to be a complete

recitation of all of the services to be provided by the Osguthorpes in consideration for
the single, annual payment. Id. The reason all the terms and conditions of the
agreement for use of real property and services in exchange for a single annual
payment were not included in the written document was because the Osguthorpes and
ASC Utah trusted each other and they "both understood what [the full agreement] was."
Blaise Carrig Deposition at 55:14-15, 64:9-65:25 (R. 958).
21.

Blaise Carrig testified that "we just felt that in a whole that this was the

arrangement. And we never had a reason to separate the value of one piece from
another. One of the pieces of value is that we didn't think that the land without the
support in order to get the permits and the continued, ongoing planning and
consultation to make the whole operation and planning piece work, that the land use
was basically worthless if we didn't get the whole plan to be successful." Blaise Carrig
Deposition at 38:21 - 39:4 (R. 958). Blaise Carrig also testified that a reference in the
written document was specifically intended to be a reference to the required services in
exchange for the single annual payment. Blaise Carrig Deposition at 31:15-23 (R. 958).
22.

Further, Blaise Carrig, the president of ASC Utah, Inc., testified in his

deposition that the parties to the agreement intended the annual payment due to be
10

paid in consideration of both the use of land and also services to be rendered by D. A.
Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe. Deposition of Blaise Carrig, at 40:3-12 (R. 958).
23.

The specific reference to the Osguthorpes' participating in the master

planning process was meant to be a reference to the services that the Osguthorpes
were to provide under the only agreement they had with ASC Utah, Inc., in exchange
for the single pre-payment. Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, at fflj 5-6 (R. 962-63). Blaise
Carrig further testified in his affidavit: "ASCII has not attempted to allocate the annual
payment between payment for use of the real property and payment for the personal
services rendered by the Osguthorpes. There has never been any need for such an
allocation because the parties clearly intended the annual payment to include payment
for both use of the real property and personal services." Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, at H 8
(R. 764).
24.

Stephen Osguthorpe, in his affidavit, also makes clear that was his intent

in entering into the agreement: "That agreement was for a single payment for both real
estate and services. The real estate interest was formalized in a document, but not the
services, even though the payment was for both. Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, j[ 3
(R. 750). Stephen Osguthorpe further testified: "At no time was it ever intended by the
family partnership or me in the negotiations that the payments referenced in the
document were solely for property." Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, fl 4 (R. 750-51).
Moreover, Stephen Osguthorpe testified:
To the contrary, the express intent of the parties in the negotiation
was that the written agreement would be signed only to allow it to
be recorded to protect any property rights that Wolf Mountain had
in the use of the property, but that the document did not contain all
of the terms and conditions of the agreement and was not intended
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to contain all the terms and conditions of the agreement or to be an
integrated document concerning the agreement. Instead, the
agreement provided that the payment was also for the provision of
services to be provided by my father and me to Wolf Mountain and,
from the date of that agreement forward, my father and I each
provided services to Wolf Mountain.
Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe at U 4 (R. 750-51).
25.

With respect to the July 28,1997 amendment, Stephen Osguthorpe again

testified:
However, at no time did I intend on behalf of myself individually, or
the family partnership, to have that document represent the entirety
of all the terms and conditions of the agreement. To the contrary,
my intent was that the document would not reflect all the terms and
conditions of the agreement, because the agreement was far
broader than what we placed into the document.
Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe at U 6 (R. 751).
26.

Stephen Osguthorpe likewise testified with respect to the August 10,1998

amendment:
However, once again, there was never any intention on my part,
either individually or on behalf of the family partnership, that such
document would represent the entire agreement and, in fact, it did
not, although it more clearly referenced the planning services I
provided and was to provide. It was used solely as a tool to protect
The Canyons' interest in real estate, but was not an integration of
the agreement and understanding between The Canyons, on the
one hand, and D. A. Osguthorpe, the family partnership and me, on
the other hand. It was intended and all parties understood that the
agreement was much broader and that my father, the family
partnership and I, and primarily me, would provide services to The
Canyons in exchange for the payment every year from The
Canyons.
Affidavit of Stephen A. Osguthorpe, U 7 (R. 751-52).
27.

The price term for both the use of real property and services, combined,

was clearly agreed for each year as a single dollar amount. Affidavit of Stephen A.
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Osguthorpe at If 9 (R. 752-53).
28.

Each year Stephen A. Osguthorpe and his father have provided services

required in exchange for the payment. Affidavit of Stephen A. Osguthorpe, U 4 (R.
750-51).
29.

Smith has offered no evidence into the record of any kind, at any time, to

controvert the testimony of all the parties to this arms-length transaction concerning the
single agreement and single payment for both use of real estate and for provision of
services. Nor has Smith, at any time, produced any evidence into the record to
controvert testimony concerning the services that were provided to Wolf Mountain
Resorts and ASC Utah under the terms of the agreement. See Record, passim.
30.

The original judgment was entered herein on June 8, 2001. See

Judgment (R. 799-800).
31.

On June 29, 2001, Smith applied for issuance under that judgment of a

writ of Garnishment to ASC Utah, Inc. See Application for Writ of Garnishment (R.
814-15).
32.

ASC Utah, Inc. filed garnishee answers to interrogatories, describing the

nature of its ostensible indebtedness as derived from its agreements, not only with
defendants, but also with non-party Stephen A. Osguthorpe. See Garnishee Answers
to Interrogatories (R. 845-46).
33.

Defendants requested a hearing on the garnishment (R. 858-59).

Defendants also filed a traversal to the garnishee answers to interrogatories, asserting,
inter alia, that some portion of the pre-payments would be payable to non-party
Stephen A. Osguthorpe, individually, by ASC Utah, Inc., and not them, and were
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therefore not subject to garnishment. See Reply to Answers of Garnishees (R. 865-66).
34.

At the time the writ of garnishment was served, there was in fact no

amount currently due from ASC Utah, Inc. as to any person because, under the terms
of the agreement and generally accepted accounting principles, the payments were prepayments for the use of real estate and services to be provided in the future, and they
were not debt. See Affidavit of Ray S. Ellison, CPA (R. 872-78).
35.

The trial court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing, essentially granting

summary judgment against defendants on their traversal of garnishment, and overruled
defendants' objection that non-party Stephen A. Osguthorpe was a necessary party and
determined, regardless of what work non-party Stephen A. Osguthorpe might be
required to perform in the future year, that all of the money to be paid from ASC Utah,
Inc. was attachable to pay the judgment. See Memorandum Decision (R. 949-53).
36.

Stephen A. Osguthorpe had threatened ASC Utah with suit if it did not pay

him for services to be rendered by him in the future, which dispute was settled by entry
into a Restatement of Agreement, dated August 1, 2001 (R. 935-47). Under the
Restatement of Agreement, there was an acknowledgment of Stephen A. Osguthorpe's
individual right to receive payment for services he was to provide, individually, and
allocation of the annual pre-payment between use of real estate and services. See id.
37.

Further, the question of the fair market value of the annual use of the

Trust's real estate by ASC Utah, Inc. each year, with respect to what portion of the
annual payment was to be assigned to that use, was to be resolved by the mechanism
of each side of the transaction hiring independent and qualified real estate appraisers to
appraise the fair market value of the actual annual use. See Restatement of
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Agreement, fl 4.1 (R. 940) (mandating each side of the contract hire a real estate
appraiser with no less than ten years experience to come up with an independent fair
market value for the annual easement, which appraisal shall be averaged to
established the amount of consideration to be allocated as payment for the easement
on an annual basis).
38.

The fair market value of the actual use of the small portion of the Trust's

real property actually used by ASC Utah, Inc., determined under the Restatement of
Agreement by the average of the independent appraisals, is the sum of $3,275.50. See
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to Revisit and/or Clarify the
Court's July 8, 2003 Memorandum Decision and Objection to Form of Judgment, at 6
(R. 1239); Defendants' Memorandum in Their Motion to Revisit and/or Clarify the
Court's July 8, 2003 Memorandum Decision and Objection to Form of Judgment, at 10,
R. 1220); Garnishee Answers to Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 3, dated
November 19, 2003 (R. 1288).
39.

The original judgment was reversed by this Court as to damages on

October 31, 2002. See Smith I.
40.

After that reversal, the trial court entered its order releasing the funds

attached by the writ, not to the garnishee ASC Utah, Inc., but rather to Smith. (R. 126061).
41.

The Summary Judgment subject of this appeal is several hundred

thousand dollars higher than the original judgment, although no facts justifying such an
increased award were set forth in the motion or supporting memorandum. See
Judgment (R. 1262-63), Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
15

1135-46).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

When the trial court entered summary judgment on Smith's renewed motion after
remand, it committed the following errors:
1.

The trial court granted relief that is at variance from the relief Smith sought

in his complaint, that sought "an order directing the Osguthorpes to account to Smith for
all monies received by them from a lease or leases and any amendments thereto of the
property described in the Agreement and for judgment for amounts found to be owing to
Smith, together with interest thereon as provided by law." See Complaint, Prayer for
Relief, U 1 (R. 5). The trial court never ordered any accounting of monies received by
defendants and simply entered judgment based upon payments made by ASC Utah,
Inc., regardless of the payee, despite the fact that the real property had been
transferred prior to the litigation (or notice of any claim) to a non-party, despite the fact
that part of the payment was for services rendered, rather than use of the real estate,
and despite the fact that the fair market value for the use of the real property, to the
extent and in the manner used by ASC Utah, Inc. is less than four thousand dollars per
year.
2.

Smith had not properly supported his motion by setting forth allegedly

uncontested facts supported by portions of the record relied upon, yet the trial court
allowed Smith to proceed in that manner, thereby denying defendants due process of
law.
3.

The trial court failed to support its ruling by explaining it; and

4.

The trial court awarded additional sums, beyond the original judgment,
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with no evidence that any payments in fact were received by defendants.
5.

The trial court ignored facts in the record that create genuine issues of

material fact precluding summary judgment.
Those facts include: (1) Testimony from parties on both sides of the arms-length
contract, to the effect that the documents executed by ASC Utah, Inc. and the
Osguthorpes were not intended to be integrations; (2) testimony from both sides of the
arms-length agreements that only a portion of each single, annual pre-payment was for
the use of real estate and the major portion was for provision of services and access to
Stephen Osguthorpe's connections with local community leaders that have value to
ASC Utah, Inc.; (3) the documents contain no integration clauses; (4) the fair market
value of the actual use of the real estate each year is less than $4,000.; and (5) the
Restatement of Agreement allocates $3,275.50 per year for use of the real estate.
The trial court committed error in its final order on the garnishment proceedings
based upon the original judgment, by releasing the escrowed funds to Smith, for the
following reasons: (1) When the original judgment was reversed, the original writ
became a nullity, so the trial court had no more jurisdiction over the funds and should
have returned them to the garnishee, ASC Utah, Inc.; (2) the trial court's failure to hold
an evidentiary hearing on defendants' defense that Stephen A. Osguthorpe was the
owner of the funds constituted a denial of due process.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

This case is before this Court for review of the entry of summary judgment in
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favor of Smith and against D. A. Osguthorpe and the Osguthorpe Family Partnership,
on damages. "On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party [here, Smith]
bears the burden of proof for its motion, namely, the burden of proving that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 329 (Utah 1997) (on
rehearing).
"A trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness."
Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262, 265, 2000 UT 20, U 9. "Summary judgment is
appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson,
Ventulett, Stainback, and Assoc, Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 673, 2001 UT 54, H 9 (citing

UTAH

R. Civ. P. 56(C)). "Doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be
construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court before judgment can be
rendered against them unless it is obvious from the evidence before the court that the
party opposing judgment can establish no right to recovery. The trial court must not
weigh evidence or assess credibility." Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258,1261 (Utah 1984) (footnotes omitted).

II.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST
DEFENDANTS O N THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES.

The trial court ruled, on the issue of damages, that the entire annual prepayment
under the ASC Utah, Inc. agreement was exclusively for use of real property, and not
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for services. (R. 606-07, 952.) Necessarily, the trial court ruled that the entire payment
each year was made only to, and received by, defendants in this case, D. A.
Osguthorpe, individually, and the D. A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership, jointly, even
though the non-party, Dr. D. A. Osguthorpe Trust, has been the owner of the real estate
since August 20, 1998, three months before Smith ever filed suit. The trial court
entered this ruling despite the testimony of all parties to the ASC Utah, Inc. agreement
that the single, annual prepayment was for both use of real estate and for services.
The parties to the ASC Utah, Inc. agreement were unanimous in their affidavits and
deposition testimony that the writings were not intended as integrations. Because only
that portion of the payment attributable to the value of the use of the real estate and
actually received by defendants or either of them, would be able to be considered in
calculating damages against the existing defendants, genuine issues of material fact
concerning that allocation and the quantification of the actual receipt of funds by each
defendant precluded the summary judgment in favor of Smith that the trial court
entered.
A.

The Determination Of Whether A Written Agreement Was Intended To
Be An Integration Is A Factual Question; The Sworn Statements
Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact On The Question Of Whether
The Documents Were Intended To Be Integrations.

There is no question, under Utah law, that the determination of whether a
document was intended to be an integration is a question of fact, not law. In Tates, Inc.
v. Salisbury, 795 P.2d 1140 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court succinctly stated this point:
Whether a particular expression is an integration of the contract is
a question of fact, and evidence both within and without the
claimed integration is admissible to determine whether it is indeed
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an integration.
Id. at 1142. Smith argued that the documents executed by the Osguthorpes, on the
one hand, and ASC Utah, Inc., on the other hand, were intended, by each of them, to
be integrations. Yet Smith offered no factual evidence from any party, on either side of
those agreements, that they had such intent.
Nor do the agreements, themselves, contain integration clauses, and the
abbreviated nature of the documents belies any such intent. Instead, the sworn
statements from D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen A. Osguthorpe, on the Osguthorpe side
of the transaction, and Blaise Carrig, the managing director and president of ASC Utah,
Inc., on ASC Utah, Inc.'s side of the transaction, and the person who drafted the
second and third amendments, each state that they did not intend the documents to be
a full and complete representation of the entire agreement between them.
In Apache Tanklines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court held that "[a] single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of
fact. Clearly, it is not for a court to weigh the evidence or assess credibility." Id. at 616
(quoting Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983)). Here, the sworn statements from
parties on both sides of the arms-length contract, that the services portion was not fully
explained in the documents, but was intended as part of the contract for the one annual
payment, raises an issue of material fact. That precludes a ruling on summary
judgment, as a matter of law, that the documents were intended to be an integration.
Further, in reviewing a summary judgment, this Court is required to "view the
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to" the
defendants. Arredondo v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 2001 UT 29, H 2, 24 P.3d 928,
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929. The testimony is unequivocal that the Osguthorpes, and especially non-party-tothe-litigation Stephen A. Osguthorpe, have in fact provided services to ASC Utah, Inc.
under the agreement whenever ASC Utah, Inc. desired. The reasonable inference from
that fact is that the documents were not intended to be integrations because the parties,
themselves, were behaving as though the provision of services by Stephen A.
Osguthorpe was part of the agreement for which he would be paid. See Be v. St.
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190,1195 (Utah 1981):
[T]he course of dealing of the parties gives some indication of their
intentions.... Though arguably clear on its face, where the parties
demonstrate by their actions that to them the contract meant
something quite different, the intent of the parties will be enforced.
Id.
Moreover, the absence of any integration clause in the documents, themselves,
provides a reasonable inference that the parties did not intend the documents to be
integrations. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. United States, 129 F.3d 1226,
1236 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (absence of integration clause leaves factual question about
completeness and finality); accord American Security Bank, N.A. v. York, 1992 WL
237375 (D.D.C.) (absence of integration clause is probative on question of parties'
intent), copy attached as Addendum 4.
The Osguthorpes and Wolf Mountain agreed on a single price to pay for both the
use of real estate and services, that price being $100,000, due and payable in advance
on August 12 of each year, and both sides of the arms-length agreement
independently testified to that fact. See Affidavit of Stephen Osguthorpe, dated
January 26, 2001 at fflj 3-8 (R. 749-760); Deposition of Blaise Carrig, R. 958 at 38:2121

39:4 (R. 958).
Commencing with the July 28,1997 modification, express reference is made in
the writing to issues surrounding the provision of services. For example, in the July 28,
1997 writing, Stephen Osguthorpe (not a party to this litigation), individually, is a named
party to the agreement. Stephen Osguthorpe is expressly required, in paragraph 1 of
that agreement, to "approve" the alignment of a road prior to construction. In ffl[ 2, 3
and 4 of that writing, Stephen Osguthorpe is required to give approval for certain
construction plans. The same is true in paragraph 8 of that agreement. In paragraph 9,
the document specifically states: "[ASCII] will include the Osguthorpes in their master
planning process." The agreement then concludes: "Both parties agree to work
together in good faith and to maintain open communications. [ASCU] accepts the
obligation to notice and seek approval from the Osguthorpes on any matters of change
to their lands."
In the August 10,1998 modification, the agreement, again expressly names
Stephen Osguthorpe as a party. That writing again expressly states: "Both parties
agree to work together in good faith and maintain open communication." Smith offers
no explanation of how working together and approvals would be required if the
documents simply dealt with the use of real property, as he contends.
The Affidavit of Blaise Carrig, the president and managing director of ASC Utah,
Inc., provides further evidence of the overall scope of services and requirements for the
Osguthorpes to cooperate, as part of a single agreement. Mr. Carrig testifies in his
affidavit:
Although the Osguthorpe agreement [referencing the ASCU
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agreement] specifically refers to the use of certain portions of the
Osguthorpe's real property by Wolf Mountain in exchange for an
annual payment of $100,000, it was my understanding from
discussions with Kenneth Griswold, the managing member of Wolf
Mountain, that the annual payment also included payment for
personal services rendered by D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen
Osguthorpe which were critical to the success of the master
planning and permit approval process for [ASCU].
Carrig Affidavit at fl4 (R. 762) (emphasis added). Mr. Carrig continued:
On July 28,1997, Les Often, the president of American Skiing
Company, the parent company of ASCU, and I met with D. A.
Osguthorpe and Stephen Osguthorpe in a sheep meadow to
discuss various issues related to the Osguthorpe agreement,
including an expansion of the personal services provided by the
Osguthorpes under the Osguthorpe agreement. Specifically, we
asked Stephen Osguthorpe to continue to assist us with the
approval process for The Canyons Spa and to provide day-to-day
consultation on land use, planning and environmental issues as
well as political and community relations. We also asked Stephen
Osguthorpe to attend planning commission and county commission
meetings on behalf of ASCU. ASCU agreed to increase the annual
payment to $150,000 in consideration for the expanded use of the
real property and the additional personal services to be provided by
the Osguthorpes.
At the conclusion of the discussion in the sheep meadow, we all
shook hands and returned to my office where I drafted the
amendment and clarification of the Osguthorpe agreement, which
was signed by the parties that same afternoon ("Amendment").
Because of the time constraints and the unique nature of our
relationship with the Osguthorpes, the Amendment is very brief and
does not include a detailed description of all of the personal
services to be provided by the Osguthorpes in consideration for the
annual payment of $150,000. Instead, it refers to the parties'
obligations to work together in good faith and maintain open
communication. ASCU never intended the Amendment to be a
complete recitation of all of the services to be provided by the
Osguthorpes in consideration for the annual payment....
In August 1998,1 met with D. A. Osguthorpe and Stephen
Osguthorpe on two occasions to discuss a new ski lift and a further
expansion of the personal services to be provided by the
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Osguthorpes. Thereafter, I drafted a second amendment to the
Osguthorpe agreement ("Second Amendment"), which was signed
by the parties on August 10, 1998. Again, the Second Amendment
is very brief and is not intended to be a complete recitation of all
[the] services to be performed by the Osguthorpes in consideration
for the annual payment.
Carrig Affidavit at fflf 5-7 (R. 762-763) (emphasis added).
Stephen Osguthorpe, the other party to the ASC Utah, Inc. agreement who is not
a party in this litigation, also submitted an affidavit, again outlining that the agreement
was a single agreement, containing both a use of real property and personal services
component. Stephen Osguthorpe's affidavit establishes that the payment was for both
use of real estate and services to be performed by him. See Affidavit of Stephen
Osguthorpe, dated January 26, 2001, at ffll 3-8 (R. 749-760).
The testimony from each side of the ASC Utah, Inc. agreement that a single
annual prepayment is to be made for both use of real estate and receipt of services
from Stephen Osguthorpe is uniform, unified and consistent. Blaise Carrig, the
president of ASC Utah, Inc. testified:
I'm saying we looked at the total agreement for the total of
$150,000 to include what we talked about in the agreement, but
also to include the other things that we agreed to in the sheep
meadow, which were Steve's consultation, Steve's support, Steve's
[ability] to help us understand things, both politically and in the land
use component of the plan, and for his ability to help facilitate
certain meetings, and the many things that I had talked about
earlier in the deposition.
Deposition of Blaise Carrig at 40:3-12 (R. 958). In fact, if ASC Utah, Inc. had not
obtained the agreement for Stephen A. Osguthorpe to assist it in getting permits and
approvals, it viewed the use of the land as a minor component: "And we never had a
reason to separate the value of one piece from another. One of the pieces of value is
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that we didn't think that the land, without the support [services] in order to get the
permits and the continued, ongoing planning and consultation to make the whole
operation and planning piece work, that the land use was basically worthless if we didn't
get the whole plan to be successful." Deposition of Blaise Carrig at 38:21-39:4 (R.
958).
In August 2001, in response to a dispute between Stephen A. Osguthorpe and
ASC Utah, Inc. that resulted from the writ of garnishment issued in this case attaching
all funds for that year's annual pre-payment, the Restatement of Agreement was
entered into, expressly adding the Trust as a party to the ASC Utah, Inc. agreement
and expressly allocating the annual pre-payment between the fair market value of the
actual annual use of the Trust's real estate by ASC Utah, Inc., and the retainer services
to be rendered principally by Stephen A. Osguthorpe. See Restatement of Agreement
(R. 935-47).
This Court ruled in Smith I that all such extrinsic evidence is admissible to
determine whether the parties intended documents to be integrations. See Smith I,
2002 UT App. 361, U 18, 58 P.3d at 857; see also Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d
663, 665 (Utah 1985) ("Therefore, a court must first determine whether the writing was
intended by the parties to be an integration. In resolving this preliminary question of
fact, parol evidence, indeed any relevant evidence, is admissible."). The
uncontroverted evidence here establishes that neither side to the ASC Utah, Inc.
contract intended the writings to be an integration of the entire agreement. The trial
court also ignored the express modification in 2001, in the Restatement of Agreement,
that more fully described the actual agreement between ASC Utah, Inc. and the
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Osguthorpes.
Given the testimony from parties on both sides of the arms-length transaction
that the documentation was never intended to encompass the entire agreement, and
the fact that the documents, themselves, contain no integration clauses and are
exceedingly brief in their nature, and the fact that Stephen A. Osguthorpe has been a
party to the agreements, even though he never owned any of the real estate, and the
fact that the fair market value of the actual use of the real estate on an annual basis is
only $3,275.50 (see Plaintiffs Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Motion to
Revisit and/or Clarify the Court's July 8, 2003 Memorandum Decision and Objection to
Form of Judgment, at 6 (R. 1239); Defendants' Memorandum in Their Motion to Revisit
and/or Clarify the Court's July 8, 2003 Memorandum Decision and Objection to Form of
Judgment, at 10, R. 1220); Garnishee Answers to Interrogatories, Answer to
Interrogatory No. 3, dated November 19, 2003 (R. 1288)), the facts and inferences,
construed in the light most favorable to defendants, show a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the documents were intended to be integrations. That genuine issue
of material fact precludes a finding on summary judgment that the parties to the
agreement intended something that they ail testified was not their intent.
In Smith /, this Court, sua sponte, stated in dictum that: "Even if the evidence
offered on remand 'is uncontroverted, [the district] court is free to disregard such
[evidence] if it finds the evidence "self-serving and not credible."'" Smith I, 2002 UT App.
361 at T| 46, 58 P.3d at 864 (quoting Glauser Storage, LLC. v. Smedley, 2001 UT App.
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141,U 24, 27 P.3d 565).2 No evidence in the record exists, however, to suggest that
the testimony from both sides of this arms-length transaction between the Osguthorpes
and ASC Utah, Inc. could in any way not be credible. Clearly, the testimony from nonparty ASC Utah, Inc.'s managing director and president, Blaise Carrig, could not be
"self-serving" in this litigation in which ASC Utah, Inc. is not a party. ASC Utah, Inc.
must make its annual pre-payments.
In any event, this Court's quotation from Glauser Storage, LLC. v. Smedley is
not applicable to the procedural posture of this case. Glauser Storage was decided
after a trial on the merits, where issues of weight and credibility may be raised, and
certainly were hotly contested in that case. See id. at If 11, 27 P.3d at 568 ("At the
conclusion of the bench trial, the court held . . . . " )
The applicable law pertaining to factual issues analyzed in the procedural
context of summary judgment in this case, however, absolutely prohibits any such
weighing of evidence or credibility assessments. See Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d at 1261, ("Doubts,
uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be construed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Litigants must be able to present
their cases fully to the court before judgment can be rendered against them unless it is
obvious from the evidence before the court that the party opposing judgment can

2

The question of the weight or credibility of the testimony, or how the trial
court should view weight or credibility, had not been raised in the trial court or briefed by
any party to the appeal. Indeed, since the case went up on summary judgment, under
the applicable legal standards set forth in Part I of this Brief, above, weight and
credibility issues were wholly immaterial to this Court's ruling in Smith I.
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establish no right to recovery. The trial court must not weigh evidence or assess
credibility. [Emphasis added and footnotes omitted]"); accord Hause v. Armour of
America, Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) ("In considering a motion for
summary judgment, it is improper for the trial court or this court on appeal to weigh the
evidence or assess its credibility."). Thus, the trial court was not free upon remand to
weigh the proffered evidence or to assess the credibility of the affidavits or deposition
testimony.
Particularly telling, concerning the trial court's error, is its unwillingness to
properly explain its decision after summary judgment on remand. The trial court failed
to comply with the apparent intent of this Court in remanding, i.e., to require specificity
in the trial court's ruling. In that regard, this Court's remand direction in Smith I appears
to follow the Utah Supreme Court's direction in the case of Platts v. Parents Helping
Parents dba Turnabout, 947 P.2d at 663 (Utah 1997):
It is unclear what undisputed facts the trial court relied upon
in its grant of summary judgment wherein it concluded that
Turnabout was a "health care provider." Without an adequate basis
of undisputed facts, summary judgment is inappropriate. Without
an adequate indication as to the undisputed facts that were applied
to the law, it is impossible to determine on appeal whether the trial
court erred in its application of the law to those facts. Therefore,
the court of appeals should have remanded the matter to the
trial court to set out an adequate basis of undisputed facts to
justify its grant of summary judgment or, if necessary, to hold
further proceedings to make adequate factual determinations.
Therefore, the court of appeals erred in concluding, as a matter of
law and without an undisputed factual basis, that Turnabout was
not a "health care provider."
Id. (emphasis added). In fact, in this case, no evidence supports the trial court's
decision, and all evidence is contrary.
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B.

There Has Never Been Any Evidence Offered Of Exactly What
Payment D.A. Osguthorpe Has Received, Nor Of What the
Osguthorpe Family Partnership Has Received, So As To Support
Specific Dollar Judgments Against Either.

Smith's Complaint sought, as a prerequisite to entry of money judgments against
either D.A. Osguthorpe or the Osguthorpe Family Partnership, an accounting of what
funds had been received by each. See Complaint, Prayer for Relief (R. 5-6). In
addition to not determining how the payments were segregated between use of real
estate and services, the trial court simply glossed-over the necessary factual step of
determining what payments each defendant had in fact received, so as to be required
to "share" with Smith.
The trial court substituted, for proof that was not offered by Smith, its speculation
that D.A. Osguthorpe and the Osguthorpe Family Partnership somehow would jointly
and severally respond in damages (again, without any factual basis for such liability) for
whatever payments were made by ASC Utah, Inc. to any person or successor-ininterest in the real estate. Such conclusion, unsupported by record facts, does not
meet the requirements of Rule 56 to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law, and is nothing but an unconstitutional, arbitrary and capricious guess. The ruling is
infirm under due process requirements for failure to require compliance with the
mandatory requirement of Rule 4-501 that facts be separately set forth with record
citations and as being an arbitrary and capricious conclusion. There is not even any
legal theory that could support both defendants being liable under the 1966 Document
for payments received only by one or the other, let alone payments received by nonparties, such as the Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe Trust, which became entitled to the payments
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upon becoming a successor-in-interest to ownership of the land. Neither the Due
Process clauses of the Utah or United States constitutions tolerate penalizing
defendants, because they have freely exercised their right to convey their land, by
imposing a damages award against them for payments received by their successors-ininterest.
Procedural due process protects against arbitrary takings by government. See
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (the procedural due process guarantee
protects against "arbitrary takings"). Such conveyance to the Trust occurred before
Smith even made any claim, and defendants cannot be punished for Smith's own
failure to name the proper successor-in-interest to the property as a defendant in this
case.
Smith here has brought a breach of contract claim, arising out of the dissolution
agreement between Smith's decedent, on the one hand, and defendant D.A.
Osguthorpe, on the other hand. The trial court itself previously characterized that
agreement as an agreement that "if the disputed property was sold or leased for a
certain price, they would split the profits." Memorandum Decision, dated December 15,
1999, at 5 (R. 206). If either defendant has not in fact received such a contractuallydefined "profit" to "split" then the entry of judgment against that defendant for that
particular sum would, a fortiori, be arbitrary and capricious.
Smith's complaint expressly asks for the following relief:
For an order directing the Osguthorpes to account to Plaintiff for all
moneys received by them from a lease or leases and any
amendments thereto of the property described in the Agreement..
»
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Complaint, Prayer For Relief, U 1 (R. 5-6) (emphasis added). This is the relief sought
because neither defendant can answer in damages for money they have not received.
Smith, in his motion for summary judgment before the trial court, offered no evidence of
any particular amount actually received by any defendant under the ASC Utah, Inc.
Agreement in any year. Had Smith followed the mandatory procedure of Rule 56 and
the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, defendants could have fully
addressed this issue, the trial court's arbitrary and capricious extension beyond the
relief pleaded, which is based utterly on speculation, is not sustainable under Rule 56
or the due process clause of the Utah and United States Constitutions.
The evidence already in the record in this case shows unequivocally that the
property was again transferred, to the Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe Family Trust, on May 13,
1998, by special warranty deed (recorded August 20, 1998, months before this litigation
even commenced). See Affidavit of Mary Katherine Johnston, dated April 27, 2000,
and Exhibits thereto constituting recorded special warranty deed, attached thereto as
Exhibit "A" (R. 526-548). To the extent that such non-party Trust has received monies
to which Smith claims a right to "share equally," a damages award could enter only
against the Trust, and not D.A. Osguthorpe or the Family Partnership, after the Trust
owned the property and became legally entitled to receive the payments.
No evidence was submitted by Smith to show that either defendant actually
received any particular amount of money from ASC Utah, Inc., pursuant to the
agreement, for any reason. Despite this absence of any evidentiary submission by
Smith, the trial court actually awarded several hundreds of thousands of dollars in
additional damages, against both defendants.
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III.

SINCE THIS COURT REVERSED THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT O N DAMAGES, THERE WAS
No BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO HOLD THE ESCROWED FUNDS GARNISHED FROM
ASC UTAH, INC. UPON A WRIT ISSUING UPON THAT JUDGMENT, O R TO RELEASE
THEM TO SMITH, RATHER THAN ASC UTAH, INC.

The original judgment was reversed by this Court with respect to damages, and
this Court ruled that the absence of an integration would mean that "there is a material
issue of fact as to damages." Smith I, 2002 UT App. 361, U 45. In other words, a
separation of the annual payment into components for use of real estate and for
payment for services would result in a reduction of any judgment to Smith.
More significantly, however, the trial court had no right to continue to hold funds
attached upon a garnishment that was predicated upon the now-reversed judgment, or
to release them to Smith. Since the original judgment was no longer effective due to
the reversal, the garnishment was no longer effective and the funds should have been
released to the garnishee, ASC Utah, Inc., for payment to Stephen Osguthorpe under
its contract. Utah law is quite clear that the writ of garnishment and interim garnishee
order entered by the trial court on the original judgment which this Court reversed were
of no further effect. "It is undisputed that a writ of execution may only be issued on a
'final' judgment, and a writ of execution issued on a judgment which has been reversed
or set aside is of no effect. D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
See generally, 30 Am.Jur.2d Executions § 12 (1967)." Thus, the garnisheed funds
were no longer subject to the power of the trial court and the trial court should have
authorized Zions Bank to release those funds to garnishee ASC Utah, Inc. for payment
to Stephen A. Osguthorpe under its contract, instead of releasing them to Smith.
Finally, Rule 64D(i) clearly contemplates a trial, and a jury trial, if requested, of
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contested fact issues on garnishments. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 64D(i) ("Such new matter
in reply shall be taken as denied and the matter thus at issue shall be tried in the same
manner as other issues of like nature. Judgment shall be entered upon the verdict or
finding the same as if the garnishee had answered according to such verdict or
finding.") The party traversing a garnishment is "entitled to have them tried." Troshinsky
v. Feldman, 81 A.2d 91, 93 (D.C. 1951). Accord Stewart v. Stewart, 160 Ga. App. 463,
464, 287 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1981)("The trial court erred in ruling that Code Ann. § 24305b does not apply to garnishment actions, and in refusing to hear evidence based on
appellant's traverse that the appellee had withheld visitation rights."). The trial court's
refusal to allow a trial on defendants' traversal denied defendants due process of law
and was error, invalidating the garnishment proceeding.
CONCLUSION

The summary judgment on damages should be reversed and the case
remanded for trial on damages. The garnishee order releasing $200,000 (together with
accrued interest) to Smith should be reversed, and an order entered that such funds
should be paid to the garnishee, ASC Utah, Inc.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^

^ day of April, 2004.

PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE

A Professional Corporation

DAVID W. SCOFIELD

Attorneys for the Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the above
and foregoing Appellants' Opening Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, this
day of April, 2004, to the following:
Robert G. Wing
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Hardin A. Whitney
Moyle & Draper, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM 1

Hardin A. "Whitney (3456)
MOYLE& DRAPER, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 521-0250

FILES DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Deputy Clerk

Robert G. Wing (4445)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(8oi)524.iooo

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS

IMAGED

DATr_

b Tc/lL

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as
Personal Representative of the Estate
of ENOCH SMITH, JR.,
JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

vs.
D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an
individual, and D.A. OSGUTHORPE
FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants.

Civil No. 98-091-1302

Judge Glen IwaSaki

On September 12, 2000, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision. Based upon that
Memorandum Decision,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff recover from Defendants

$498,441.02, which includes prejudgment interest through September 20,2000. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT Plaintiff recoverfromDefendants daily prejudgment
interest in the amount of $88.53 per day from September 20, 2000 until the date this Judgment
is entered, and that Plaintiff recover from Defendants postjudgment interest at the rate of
8.052% until paid, plus court costs of $ 507.27.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, DECLARED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants are
obligated to pay to Plaintiff Plaintiff's share of future lease payments as described in the
Dissolution Agreement dated November 3, 1966 and that this Court shall retain continuing
jurisdiction over this matter.
DATED this £ _ day

tfr-^fA^

, 2001.
BYT]

Glenn K. Iwasaki
Third Judicial Court Judge

ADDENDUM 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as P e r s o n a l
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e E s t a t e of
ENOCH SMITH, JR.
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 980911302
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI

Court Clerk:

Ja*®MMfaxSfMtn

June 30, 2003

Third Judicial District

JJL - 8 2003

D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual,
and D.A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

LTUK* COUNTY

By..XagjTfS?

\(Yit,^
Deputy Clerk

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, for Modification
Judgment and for Release of Escrowed Funds.

of

The Court heard oral

argument with respect to the matter on June 30, 2003.

Following

the hearing, the issue was taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown hereby enters the
following ruling.
Plaintiff

filed

this

Complaint

alleging,

pursuant

to a

Partnership Dissolution Agreement, he was entitled to his share of
proceeds from the Lease Agreement between D. A. Osguthorpe and The
Canyons.

Since this filing, several hearings have been held and

rulings made and, ultimately, the matter went up on appeal.

The

Court of Appeals affirmed all of this Court's ruling, except the

\W

SMITH v. OSGUTHORPE

Page 2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

one relating to whether the Lease Agreement was an integrated
agreement.

Specifically, the Court of Appeals held:

On remand the district court should make clear
it considered the parole evidence in ruling
the lease and the amendments are integrated or
it should take evidence to determine if the
lease and the amendments are integrated.
In support of the motion, plaintiff asserts the Court did
consider the parole evidence in ruling the lease and amendments are
integrated and such is evident from the record.

Specifically,

plaintiff cites to various affidavits, Memorandum Decisions and
statements during oral argument, wherein the issue of integration
was considered and analyzed.

Additionally, plaintiff seeks entry

of a new judgment arguing this Court has already determined the
lease agreement to be integrated, consequently, all of the payments
from The Canyons are lease payments. Finally, plaintiff notes the
parties put a garnished lease payment for the 2001 lease in an
interest bearing saving account-pending further resolution of this
matter.

If the Court grants plaintiff's Motion

for

Summary

Judgment, it is plaintiff's position the Court should enter an
order releasing the funds in .Zions Bank to plaintiff and the
judgment should be reduced accordingly.
Defendants oppose the motion arguing plaintiffs have failed to
set forth a proper statement of facts.

Additionally, contend

defendants, the sworn statements from D.A. Osguthorpe and Stephen

SMITH v. OSGUTHORPE
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

A. Osguthorpe, on the Osguthorpe side of the transaction, and
Blaise Carrig, on the ASC Utah side of the transaction, each state
that they did not intend the documents to be a full and complete
representation of the agreement between them.

Moreover, assert

defendants, the decision of the Court of Appeals requires this
Court to apportion the lease payments and there are genuine issues
of material fact as to whether and how much of the payment was for
the use of real estate that would be covered under the dissolution
agreement.

Finally, it is defendant's position that since the

judgment was reversed, this Court has no right to hold funds
attached upon a garnishment.
Although not specifically stated, the Court finds that after
reviewing the procedural history in this matter, it is clear parole
evidence was considered in the rulings rendered in this matter.
Indeed, in making its various decisions, the Court considered the
Affidavits
Carrig.

of D.A.

Osguthorpe, Stephen Osguthorpe

and

Blaise

Moreover, the Court heard parole evidence during oral

argument, prior to rendering

its decision.

In sum,

judgment, as requested by plaintiff, is appropriate.

summary

Further, in

light of this ruling, a new judgment should be entered reflecting
current amounts.

Plaintiff is asked to submit such a judgment to

the Court for signature.

Finally, based upon the forgoing, the

Court orders the escrowed funds currently held in Zions Bank be

HI*

SMITH v. OSGUTHORPE

released.
DATED this /
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Jm?
day of &aif£r 2003,

GLENN K. IWASAKI o'\
DISTRICT COURT dtftfpJSO*-*
,/

Wv>

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 980911302 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this • _ & _ day of

"CEINA.JU,

NAME
DAVID W SCOFIELD
ATTORNEY DEF
111 E BROADWAY 11TH FLR
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
HARDIN A WHITNEY
ATTORNEY PLA
CITY CENTER I, SUITE 900
175 EAST FOURTH SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84111-0000

/2 0 ^ ^

75
k$Ji±
J&
Deputy Court Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ENOCH SMITH, JR.
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 980911302
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI

vs.

Court Clerk: Janet Banks
D.A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual,
and D.A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

August 27, 2003

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendants' Motion to Revisit and/or to Clarify the Court's July 8,
2003 Memorandum Decision and Defendants' Notice of Objection to
Proposed Form of Judgment and Form of Order Releasing Escrowed
Funds. Although a hearing was requested, such is not required by
the Rules of Judicial Administration, nor is the Court persuaded
argument would be of assistance in the instance. Accordingly, the
ruling with respect to the aforementioned will be addressed in this
Minute Entry.
Turning first to Defendants' Motion to Revisit and/or Clarify,
after reviewing the record in this matter, the Court is persuaded
its July 8, 2003 Memorandum Decision clearly follows the direction
of the Utah Court of Appeals by reviewing the procedural history of
the case and stating that it had considered the proffered parole
evidence.
Nothing remains to be considered.
Accordingly,
Defendants' Motion is, respectfully, denied.
As to Defendants' Notice of Objection to Proposed Form of
Judgment and Form of Order Releasing Escrowed Funds, the Court
finds such to be without merit and, accordingly, the objections are
overruled. The Court will sign the Judgment and Order Releasing
Escrowed Funds as submitted by plaintiff.
This Minute Entry constitutes the Order regarding the matters
addressed herein. No further order is required.

SMITH V. OSGUTHORPE

DATED th

»Z0

Page 2

MINUTE ENTRY

day of August, 2003

GLENN K. FWASAKI
DISTRICT COURT JUD^E1
\

si2*>*

1*5*

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 980911302 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s S ^

day of

NA'VCVV^A

NAME
DAVID W SCOFIELD
ATTORNEY DEF
111 E BROADWAY 11TH FLR
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
HARDIN A WHITNEY
ATTORNEY PLA
CITY CENTER I, SUITE 900
175 EAST FOURTH SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84111-0000
,- 2 0 ^ 6 .

C
Deputy Court Clerk
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IMAGED
Hardin A. Whitney (#3456)
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 521-0250

FH.g®®i§?MTCSUIT
Third Judicial District

Robert G. Wing (#4445)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Plaintiff

2 8 2003
Deputy Clerk

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
DATE_

Of? Irf

[**.

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ENOCH SMITH, JR.
Plaintiff
JUDGMENT

vs.
D. A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual,
and D. A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants.

Civil No. 980911302
Judge Glen Iwasaki

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff recover from Defendants, jointly
and severally, $845,173.02 which includes prejudgment interest through July 11, 2003. It is
further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT Plaintiff recover from Defendants daily
prejudgment interest in the amount of $170.35 per dayfromJuly 11, 2003, until the date this

Judgment is entered, and that Plaintiff recover from Defendants post judgment interest at the
rate of 3.41% until paid, plus court costs of $507.27.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, DECLARED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants are
obligated to pay to Plaintiff its share of future lease payments as described in the Dissolution
Agreement dated November 3, 1966 and that this Court shall retain continuing jurisdiction
over this matter.
Concurrently with the entry of this Judgment, the Court has entered an Order releasing certain
escrowed funds to Plaintiff. Upon the receipt of the escrowed funds Plaintiff is ordered to file a
Satisfaction of Judgment equal to the amount received,
lis ^S
DATED this

dayol

ly, 2003.
BY THE COURT

Honorable GUehn K. Iwasaki X'^/T1,";
Third Judicial District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

David W. Scofield
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the \\ ' day of July, 2003,1 served a copy of the foregoing
JUDGMENT by hand delivery, to:
David W. Scofield
Parsons, Kinghorn & Peters
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

ADDENDUM 5

Hardin A. Whitney (#3456)
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C.
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 521-0250

F§L^ilST5l8S?T©8fti8t
Third Judicial District

Robert G. Wing (#4445)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ENOCH SMITH, JR.
Plaintiff
vs.
D. A. OSGUTHORPE, an individual,
and D. A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:

ORDER RELEASING
ESCROWED FUNDS
Civil No. 980911302

Judge Glen Iwasaki

TO ZIONS BANK:
You are herewith authorized and directed to release the funds deposited with you in
money market account entitled Estate of Enoch Smith, Jr., Account Number 003-68566-6, to
Enoch Richard Smith, Personal Representative of the Estate of Enoch Smith, Jr. Upon delivery

I^LLO

of all of the flmds in the account, it may be closed.
DATED t h i a r ^

day o ^ S y f 2003.
BY THE

Honorable Gl
Third Judicial

Approved as to form:

David W. Scofield
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the _v day of July, 2003,1 served a copy of the
foregoing ORDER RELEASING ESCROWED FUNDS by hand delivery, to:
David W. Scofield
Parsons, Kinghorn & Peters
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this i?—'
day of Uovember, 1966, by and between ENOCH SMITH, JR., of Salt
Lake City, Utah, hereinafter referred to as First Party, and
D. A. OSOOTHORPB, of Salt Lake County, State of Dtah, hereinafter referred to as Second Party,
W I T H B S S B T H i
WHEREAS, First and Second Parties, for over ten (10)
years were partners primarily engaged in the cattle and sheep
businesses, having operated under the partnership names of
Av & En, Aveneen Land & Livestock Company, and Aveneen Partnership, Tand as Red Pine Land- & Livestock company, ana in some
instances operated some portions of the partnership businesses
under their individual names without disclosing the partnership
relationship between them; and
WHEREAS, First and Second Parties have heretofore
terminated all partnership relations entered into byfchamas
partners and have discontinued the partnership businesses,
dissolved the partnership or partnerships that have heretofore
existed between them, and now desire to settle all of the rights
between them in the partnership businesses and affairs;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT 18 HEREBY AGREED by and between

^
JJTj

First and Second Parties as follows 1
Except as hereinafter reserved to First Party, First
Party agrees to sell to Second Party all of First Party's
right, title, interest and estate in and to all partnership

O
s^
O
O

assets, and Second Party agrees to purchase from .First Party
all of his said right, title, interest and estate in and to
all partnership assets upon the following terms and conditions,
to-witi
1.

The partnership assets and properties covered

hereby shall includei
(a) Any cash on hand and all accounts receivable
this date;
(b) All sheep, including ewes, bucks and lambs,
together with all registered brands and markings;
(c) All grazing permits and rights, including
the Qraasing Permits located within what is known and designated by the Bureau of Land Management, U. S. Department of
the Interior as the -Fillmore, Utah-, Grazing District) -heretofore purchased from T. Traoy Wright, together With the right
to purchase an additional 500 head of sheep Permit or License
as provided in the Agreement dated the 24th day of October,
1961, between the said T. Tracy Wright, as Seller, and the
parties hereto as Buyers; Wasatah national Forest Permits for
619 head of sheep; United States Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Land Management, License for Taylor Grazing Rights,
Park City Area-Summit, U, number and class 60 S, Unit 72;
{<&) All Leases, including State of Utah Public
Land Lease No. 10925, covering 487.28 acres in Section 2,

°0'
^
CO
v.r

Township 2 South, Range 3 Bast, Summit County, Utah;
Grazing Lease from Edward Bagley and Irvin T. Nelson,

S^

covering property located in Salt Lake County, Utah;

CD
O
®

(e) All horses and other animals, if any, in
addition to the sheep;

(f) All truoks, maohinery and equipment)
(g) In addition to the above described property,
First Party agrees to sell to Second Party, his interest in
the following described real property located in Summit
County, Utah, subject, however, to the reservation of interests therein by First Party as hereinafter specifically
set fortht

J

fy
^

.j'

Lota 3, 4, ,5 and 6 of Sec. 1; T. 2 S., R. 3 5.,
Salt Lake Meridian.
Lots 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and the SB quarter of
Sec. 3; T. 2 S. R. 3 B., Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
Beginning at a point 1208.5 feet South 1°48'
West from the Northeast corner of Section 1,
Township 2 South, Range 3 Sast, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, running thence South 1*48' West
2 feet, thence South 36*08' West 168.7 feet,
thence North 89°50' West 3082.6 feet, thence
North 0,°-54' Bast 139.2 feet, thence South
89°SO' Bast 3177.6 feet to point of beginning,
containing 10 acres.
Total acres 577.33, more or less.
So long as Second Party shall use said real property as

grazing lands in connection with his operation of a sheep or
cattle business, Seoond Party shall have the right to the possession and use of the property without compensation to First Party,
but he Bhall pay the taxes and any expense of maintaining the
property.

In the event, however, that Second party or his

successor or successors in interest, during the lifetime of the

^T\

survivor of FirBt and Second Parties, plus twenty-one (21) years, ' ^
CO
in a good faith transaction, shall aell the property, or atiy part <~C
CAM

thereof at a price exceeding Twenty Dollars ($20.00) per acre,
plus the depreciated cost of any fencing that Second Party may

«g

have caused to be dona on the property, then FirBt Party shall,

O
O
CD

share equally with Second Party In the sales price paid over
Twenty Dollars ($20,00) per acre, plus said depreciated fencing
cost, and if, during Bald period of time he, or his successor
or successors in interest in the property shall lease all or any
part of the property, for any period of time commencing during
said retained interest period, at a price in excess of $1.60
per aore per year, First Party shall share equally In the excess
rental over the $1.60 per acre per year.

Furthermore, Party of

the First Part shall retain an undivided one-half (1/2) interest
in all mineral and oil rights in the property without limit as
to time.
2.

Second Party agrees to pay First Party for his

interest in the above described property, and in settlement of
ell claims heretofore existing between the parties arising out
of any of the partnership business or businesses, the sum of
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) cash, payment thereof to be
made within thirty (30) days from date hereof.

Xn addition to

the payment of said Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) to First
Party, Second Party agrees to assume, pay and otherwise perform
all of the outstanding obligations of the partnership businesses,
whether incurred under the name of Av & En, Aveneen Land & Livestock Company, Aveneen Partnership, Red Pine Land & Livestock
O
Company, or in any other names, including the personal names of £.
the parties hereto. Specifically included in these obligations, ^5
but not excluding any other obligations, are any and all bank

c

—

loans, including the amounts owing Walker Bank & Trust Company,
the loan made by Utah Livestock Production Credit Association,
the accounts owing for grazing fees to Bothwell and Swanner Co.

v^
O
O

*e$ty\JVl»0off*k and to Bdward Baglay and Irvin T. Nelson on their
grazing lease, and every and all other obligations of any of
the said partnerships, whether or not specifically set forth
herein; except, that Second Party will not assume any indebtedness owing by any of the said partnerships to Bnoch Smith Sons
Company on account of work done by said company for the partnerr
ships, except that Second Party shall pay Bnoch Smith Sons
Company for the advance made by it on account of lease fees to
Bothwall and Swanner Co:, in tha sum of $2,176.50. Further, Second
Party agrees to assume any income tax liability for the current
year and on account of any audits that may hereafter be made of
the income tax returns heretofore filed covering the partnership business or businesses. Provided, 'however, that First Party
will retain all of his books, records and other accounts relating
to the partnership businesses for a period of at least six years,
and will fully cooperate with Second party in connection with any
audita or other questions raised in connection with the partnerships' income tax returns.

Further, Second Party agrees to save

First Party harmless on acoount of that certain suit brought in
the District Court of Summit County, by Ed Roberts, Howard

, ^

Whitehouse and Marion Christenaeh, as plaintiffs, against First U J
CO
and Second Parties, case Ho. 3527. Second Party to assume the *~£
defense of the action on behalf of both himself and First Party,
and to pay all costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees

gg

that Second party may incur in defense of the action and any

CD
CD

judgment that the plaintiffs in aaid action, or any of them,
may pbtain against First party.

-63. Upon payment in full of the purchase price to be
paid by Second Party to First Party as hereinabove in paragraph
2 provided, First Party agrees to execute and deliver to Second
Party such Assignments, Deeds and Bills of Sale as may be necessary to transfer and convey to Second Party all of the interest
in the partnership businesses of First Party as hereinabove
provided, with the exception of the interests retained by him
in the real property speoifically hereinabove described in
paragraph 1 (g)
4. The parties hereto agree that the Partnerships
heretofore existing between them have been dissolved as of the
17th day of January, 1966, effective .January 1, 1S66, and notice
thereof has. hezetofoxe been-published as provided by law. TJei'ther
party has authority to wind up partnership affairs and Second
Party, by this Agreement, has succeeded to all of said partnership, affairs upon the terms and conditions hereinabove set forth.
5. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement/ the
parties hereto do hereby release and discharge one another from
all claims of whatsoever nature arising out of their former
partnership relationships.

^
r*\

WITNESS the execution hereof by the parties hereto,

V'2
1

the year and day hereinabove first written.

^

"

/ *
O^
3E
•&.
O
O
CO

)£)' &'

(UsfrltytJAit
Sesphd Party.;
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STATB OP UTAH,

)
) as.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKB, )

On the

.3-

day of HvytuuA^/

. 1966, personally

appeared before me ENOCH SMITH, JR. one of the signers of the
. s'l'tfll&bbvfr'instrument,

Who duly acknowledged t o me that he executed

Notary
Residing i n S a l t take,.City, Utah
STATE OP UTAH,

)
)

BB.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, )
On the

3 -

day of //fjjhtCtvvft*/*.

1966, personally

appeared before me 0 . A. OSGUTHORPE, one of tha signers of the
• ''^OVsjj'CMB instrument, who duly acknowledged t o me that he executed

^

-'.-:;Mr.'>M.'.:3
'•.^'.'in,^' 1 '
'"'""''

fiotary
Residing i n S a l t ilake County,Utah
/ r^

X, AFTON S. 0S6UTH0RPB, the wife of D. A. Osguthorpe,
Second Party i n the foregoing Agreement, do hereby approve the

/v\
UJ
^

above and foregoing Agreement and agree that any i n t e r e s t that
I nay have in and t o the r e a l property described i n paragraph

cSE
1 (g) of the Agreement s h a l l be subject t o the provisions of
^
O
said paragraph 1 (g) and tha other applicable provisions of the CD
foregoing Agreement.

-8-

Dated at S a l t Iiaka County, Utah, thia
•OpJ^^^JJLJ

.

3A*L.

day of

1966.

( y 6 i c / ; / (. ..•> e, ,sCt£&i4>j>J
STATS OF

OTAH,

)
)

88.

CODOTX" OF SAUT LAKE, )
?.'"£.» V*.

On ^ e

^

toy

°t ffah-t4#/]>-6f

. 1966, personally

^b&forst'mo ASTON 8 . OSGUTHORPH, one of the algnees of the
5%it&°^ ijjoi^jf^^trumant, Vho duly acknowledged t o me that she executed

STofeafy,
Residing in S a l t |^ake County,Utah

B00KWI9
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LEASE AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is made by and between D.A. OSGUTHORPE and DA.
OSGUTHQRPE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP as lessors and WOLF MOUNTAIN
RESORTS, L.C. as lessee. DA. Osguthorpe is the owner of real property
described in Exhibit "A" (hereinafter referred to as the *Tropeny"), consisting of
approximately 560 acres. Wolf Mountain, is a ski/summer resort operator and
intends to expand its operation to the Property.
In consideration of the mutual covenants, promises and conditions set fourth herein,
the parties agree as follows:
P A Osgutharpe hereby leases the specific portions of Property to Wolf Mountain
for use as a commercial recreational area, including the installation, maintenance
and operation of two ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski trails and such other
related facilities, structures and roads as may be required. Specifically Saddleback
and Doc's Knob chair lifts as identified on Exhibit "A", including ski trails servicing
Doc's Knob and lower sliver of the quarter section additionally identified on Exhibit
"A". Notwithstanding therightsgranted to Wolf Mountain herein, DA. Osguthdrpe
shall be permitted to improve and to use the Property provided that such
improvement or use does not interfere -with ski lifts and similar structures and ruris
of Lessee. Ski trails, lifts and facilities shall not be constructed on the. southernmost
#6 (40 acres) and £5 (40 acres) other dian those previously identified of the
Property described in Exhibit "A*' paragraph 1.
Wolf Mountain shall pay to DA. Osguthorpe annual rental payments for the
Property in the amount of S100,OQO due and payable on August 12 of each year.
The term of the lease shall expire twenty eight years from the execution date of this
agreement
AGREED, GRANTED AND ACCEPTED, this W!&y of August, 1996.
D J . OsE«itorpe "iMar
(J

fir
ff

/
y

Kcttos&W. Qris
Mountain Resofe. L.C.
WoLfMount

DA. OsgufciarpaSanuly PanaersWp
WrmESS:

0046OS92

EsdWSS Ps00780

EXHIBIT "B n
i:=WK4

e;uruwH"i:n<

P.KTBb?.RjeR

wanTW J.UC!NnS:lXH=i
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ADDENDUM 8

8f
The following agreement amends and clarifies the existing agreement dated the 14th day
of August, 1996 between Wolf Mountain (now The Canyons) and the Osguthorpe family:
Klllington,

1) The Canyons will construct a jeep/snowmobile road from the top
of Saddleback towards Red Pine Lake and on toward the bottom of
Saddleback area. The road will also be continued from the top of
Saddleback to the northwest corner of Section 3. Steve Osguthorpe and
Blaise Carrigto approve the alignment prior to construction.
2) The Canyons will relocate and upgrade the existing Saddleback
lift to the location approved by Steve Osguthorpe and Blaise Camg.
3) The Canyons will be able to complete the Saddleback area trail
construction as approved by Steve Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig.

1/7

Sunday River, ME
Sugarbush, VT
Mount Snow, V7
tiuysack,

VT

SugarIoaf/USAr

Mf

Anhash Bex Peak, NfPlco, VT

4) The Canyons are able to relocate and upgrade the existing
Spotted Owl chair to the location shown on the attached map. This
relocation to be approved by and Blaise Carrig and Steve Osguthorpe.
5) The Canyons will repair and upgrade the lower jeep road on
Osguthorpe property as shown on the .attached map for
construction and maintenance access.
6) The Canyons will construct and maintain a road on Osguthorpe
property from Red Pine Lake to the top of Tombstone. This road is
to be used by the Canyons construction and maintenance only.
7) Tie Canyons commits to working with the Osguthorpe family to
ensure that snowmobile and horse riding operation can continue for
the entire terms of this agreement. The Canyons committed to
working with the Osguthorpes to resolve any issue? of the
interference or conflict between these operations and the ski
development.
8) The Canyons can construct a ski trail that crosses the south west comer
of lot 5 of the Osguthorpe property quarter section. This trail to be
approved by Steve Osguthorpe and and Blaise Carrig
Sunday River Road

9) The Canyons will include the Osguthorpes in their master planning
process.

P O Box 450
Bsrhel, Maine M277
207.824.81 DO lei
207.324.511 Ofay

-H.1

10) The Canyons will pay an adairional 550,000 in lease payments for the
term of the August 14th, 1996 agreement to the Osguthorpes in
consideration for this agreement..
Both parties agree to work together in good faith and *o maintain open
communications. The Canyons accepEs the obligation to notice and seek approval
from the Osguthorpes an any matters of change to their lands.
Sunday River, Atf
Sufarbush, VT

AGREED, GRANTED AND ACCEPTED, this 2Sihday of July, 19.97

Mounl Snow, ^
Haystack, VT

For the Osguthorpes

For The Canyons

Sugarlaal/USA. M?
Attiosh'Be>rf*kN
LssiifiB. Ottsn, President
The Csnyons (FonnaDy Wolf Mountain Resort)

D.A. Osguihan^'Lessor"
Q\ # sZ~[
_ ^

Blase Cazrig, Managing D i r e a o f . /
The Canyons (Formally Wolf Mountain Resort)

SssylbsguthoTpe-

Pico. VT
^

rf

WITNESS:

GorOjo^ (.

S/j^tf

Sunday Rl«er

W

P O Bo* <50
BetKel. Maine D**1 7
207.82-i.81O0 «!
207.B2^.Sn0fa*

-r*<

ADDENDUM 9

Th& fbHcrt^gagrsamarEisBSSK^amCTdiricaEtoiheAugustK, 1996a£raemeBtb=eTwesa WolfMsanisn
Cnoxv The Crayons) aad the Osgaiharpe fcsay. This agreement is in sdasdoa to the August 24, 1996
a g r e e s i s a i and the 5 m smeadment of July 2St 1997.
3

)

The Canyons will construct and amaiti a work access roadfromthe gristing road st BsdPigg Lake
through the south' end ofsecann 3 towanis the area known as Ninety Nine - 90, Steve Osguthorpe
and Blaise Csrrig to approve the alignment of the road prior to construction.

^)

The Canyons •wQlbc pemafisd to have alpine sla operations (conaBtsnt -with their currant operations)
on. the north side ofi&teiy Has - 90 and through the southeast comer of section 3.

3

la consaderatioafcr this aassamenl, The Canyons will pay aa additional S50,000.00 in lease payments
for the term of August W, 1996 sgreemani.

)

4")

The Canyons aciaiowiedgea that under this Agreement, the August 14,1996 Agreement and the July
2g, 1997 first amendment to the August 14, 1996 Agreement, the Qsmahoipe family and DJL
Osgsithojpe have retained the right to use all of the propsny which is the subject of those
^greeaants, "as pan of their ranch operation {jacludiDE sheap and canla) aud to otherwise use and
improve suds property, so long as sieh ranch opersiion and other use and impxovetnent$ do not
damage the towers and other facDsries coostruaed on the-property by the Canyons "(and hs
predecessors in hnsrest) and do not unreasonably interfere with the usa of-die prtperty in the'winter
as part ofthe Canyons' winter skiing operations. The Canyons' agrees that the use of the property
by the Canyons' during the spring, summer, sad fall, w2i not interfere with the ranch operations of
the Osguthorpefeinfiyand D.A. Osguthorpe.

Borli.parjjes agree to work together in good iaHhand maintain open pommunaearion.
AGREED, GRANTED AND ACCEPTED, this 10th day of Angus!, 1998.
For "the Canyons

E t e ^ C a E d g , Managing
Director
The Canyons

For the Osguthorpe

£/

i.A- OsguTforpV^essor"

D.A. Ofiguthor
'FunaTypBrmBiihip"

Steve/tegulhoxpe

A

/f

WITNESS:

^(LtJjy ,U&

^ S ^ ^

SEnC3nn23?I14«I

-m

ADDENDUM 10

RESTATEMENT OF AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this J

day of August, 2001, to be

effective as of August 14, 1996 ('"Effective Date"), by and among D. A. Osguthorpe"
("Osguthorpe"), D. A Osguthorpe Family Partnership ("Partnership"), D.A. Osguthorpe, as
trustee of The Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe Trust ("Trust"), Stephen A. Osguthorpe ("S. Osguthorpe")
and ASC Utah, Inc., a Maine corporation ("ASCU"). Osguthorpe, the Trust, the Partnership,
S. Osguthorpe, and ASCU are collectively referred to herein as the "Parties", or singly as a
'Tarry" as the context requires or permits.
RECITALS:
A.

Osguthorpe, the Trust and/or the Partnership is the owner of certain real property

consisting of approximately 560 acres as described in annexed Exhibit "A" (the "Property");
B.

By agreement dated August 14, 1996, Osguthorpe, the Partnership and "Wolf.

Mountain Resorts, LX.C. (predecessor-in-interest to ASCU) ("Wolf) entered into that certain
agreement (the "Initial Agreement") under which Osguthorpe and the Partnership granted certain
rights to Wolf in, to and over the Property for use as a commercial recreational area, including
the installation, maintenance and operation of two (2) ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski
trails and such other related facilities, structures and roads as may be required to allow Wolf to
use the Property as a commercial recreation area, and Osguthorpe agreed to provide services to
Wolf;
C.

On July 28, 1997, ASCU, Osguthorpe, the Partnership and S. Osguthorpe entered

into a certain agreement amending and clarifying certain provisions of the Initial Agreement (the
'Tirst Amendment");

EXHIBIT B

D.

Among other things, the First Amendment provided that ASCU "will include the

Osguthorpes in their master planning process";
E.

On August 10, 1998, Osguthorpe, the Partnership, S. Osguthorpe and ASCU

entered into an agreement (the "Second Amendmenf) (the Initial Agreement, First Amendment
and Second Amendment are herein referred to collectively as the "Documents") •which amends
the Initial Agreement and the First Amendment;
F.

On or about May 13,1998, the Trust acquired an interest in the Property;

G.

ASCU is the owner and operator of The Canyons resort and the Property is used

in ASCU's operations. ASCU intends to expand its operations on the Property and, as it has
done in the past, ASCU intends to hire personal services of Osguthorpe and/or S. Osguthorpe to
assist it in the master planning or development of The Canyons resort;
H.

S. Osguthorpe has provided, and agrees to provide in the future, services to ASCU

to assist ASCU in its master planning and development process for The Canyons resort;
I.

A dispute has arisen between Osguthorpe, the Trust, the Partnership,

S. Osguthorpe and ASCU regarding, among other tilings, whether the payments under the
Documents are payments for lease rentals and services rendered or whether the payments are
solely for lease rentals;
J.

The Parties desire to resolve their disputes by clarifying the provisions of the

Documents and establishing a process to (i) allocate that portion of the annual payment to the fair
market value for ASCU's rights in and to the Property and to use the Property as part of its
operations of The Canyons resort, and (ii)pay for services provided by Osguthorpe and/or
S. Osguthorpe under the Documents; and
K.

4192273

The Parties desire to set forth their understandings and agreements in writing,

2

^ ( 5

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual agreements and covenants set forth
herein and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt, sufficiency and adequacy
which is hereby acknowledged by each of the Parties, the Parties agree as follows:
1.

Restatement of Documents. The Initial Agreement, First Amendment and Second

Amendment are hereby amended and restated in their entirety.
2.

Easement Grant. Osguthorpe, the Trust and the Partnership hereby grant, and

reaffirm the granting of, an easement (the "Easemenf) on, under and over the Property to ASCU
for use as a commercial recreational area, including the installation, maintenance and operation
of two (2) ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski trails and such other related facilities,
structures and roads as maybe required for such Use. Specifically Saddleback and Doc's Knob
chair lifts as identified on annexed Exhibit "B", including ski trails servicing Doc's Knob and
lower sliver ofthe quarter section additionally identified on annexed Exhibit "B". Ski trials, lifts
and facilities shall not be constructed on the southernmost parcel #6 (40 acres) and parcel #5 (40
acres) other than those previously identified on the Property as described in annexed
Exhibit "B'\
2.1

The Parties agree and acknowledge that in connection witib the Easement

ASCU has performed, or is hereby given the right to perform, the following:
2.1.1 ASCU will construct a jeep/snowmobile road from the top of
Saddleback towards Red Pine Lake and on toward the bottom of Saddleback area. The road will
also be continued from the top of Saddleback to the northwest corner of Section 3.
S. Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig will approve the alignment prior to construction.
2.1.2 ASCU will relocate and upgrade the existing Saddleback lift to the
location approved by S. Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig.

419227.3
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2.1.3 ASCU will be able to complete the Saddleback area trail
construction as approved by S. Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig.
2.1.4 ASCU is able to relocate and upgrade the existing Spotted Owl
chair to the location shown on the attached map. This relocation to be approved by Blaise Carrig
and S, Osguthorpe.
2.1.5 ASCU will repair and upgrade the lower jeep road on the Property
as shown on the attached map for construction and maintenance access;
2.1.6 ASCU will construct and maintain a road on the Property from
Red Pine Lake to the top of Tombstone. This road is to be used by the Canyons construction and
maintenance only.
2.1.7 ASCU commits to working with Osguthorpe and Partnership to
ensure that snowmobile and horse riding operation can continue for the entire term of this
Agreement ASCU is committed to working with Osguthorpe and Partnership to resolve any
issues of the interference or conflict between these operations and the ski development of The
Canyons resort
2.1.8 ASCU can construct a ski trail that crosses the south west comer of
lot 5 of the Properly quarter section. This trail to be approved by S. Osguthorpe and Blaise
Carrig.
2.1.9 ASCU will construct and maintain a work access road from the
existing road at Red Pine Lake' through the sound end of section 3 towards the area known as
Ninety Nine - 90 of the Property. S. Osguthorpe and Blaise Carrig to approve the alignment of
the rod prior to construction.

419227.3
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2.1.10 ASCU will be permitted to have alpine ski operations (consistent
with their current operations) on the north side of Ninety Nine - 90 and through the southeast
comer of section 3 of the Property.
2.2

ASCU acknowledges that under the Documents Osguthorpe and

Partnership have retained the right to use all of the Property as part of their ranch operation,
including, without limitation, grazing and other activities in connection with their sheep and
cattle operation, and to otherwise use and improve the Property, so long as such ranch operations
and other use and improvements do not damage the towers or other facilities lawfully
constructed on the Property by ASCU (or its predecessors-in-interest) and does not unreasonably
interfere with the use of the Property by ASCU in the winter as part of ASCU's winter skiing
operations. ASCU agrees that use of the Property during the spring, summer and fall months
will not interfere with the ranch operations of Osguthorpe and the Partnership.
2.3

The term of the Easement is for twenty-eight (28) years commencing

August 14,1996.
3.

Services. Osguthorpe and/or S. Osguthorpe agree to make themselves available

for consultation and/or render services to ASCU in conjunction with the operation of The
Canyons resort, the master planning for and the development of The Canyons resort, and such
other services as are reasonably requested by ASCU and which are necessary for the
development of The Canyons resort. ASCU agrees that Osguthorpe and/or S. Osguthorpe shall
have the right to delegate to a third person approved by ASCU those services required of them
under this Section 3.

419227.3
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Annual Consideration. The total annual aggregate consideration for the Easement

and services rendered under this Agreement shall be Two Hundred Thousand Dollars
($200,000). The Parties agree that this total consideration •will be apportioned as follows:
4.1

Within sixty (60) calendar days prior to August 12, 2001, Osguthorpe, the

Trust or the Partnership and ASCU shall each have appointed a real estate appraiser (each such
appraiser shall have no less than ten (10) years' experience) who shall provide appraisals setting
forth the fair market value of the Easement At or prior to the expiration of such sixty (60) day
period, the Parties shall, for purposes of establishing Hie fair market value of the Easement, take
an average of the two (2) appraised values of the Easement and such average shall be the amount
of consideration to be allocated as payment for the Easement.
4.2

All of the remaining part of the annual consideration of Two Hundred

Thousand Dollars ($200,000) shall be allocated to the payment for availability for consultation
and/or of services rendered under and in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.
4.3

The annual consideration is due and payable by ASCU to the Osguthorpes

not later than August 12 of each year.
5.

Mutual Covenants. The Parties mutually covenant and agree as follows:
5.1

Each Party agrees to work with each other Party in good faith to

accomplish the intended purposes of this Agreement to maintain open communications.
5.2

ASCU assumes the obligation to notify Osguthorpe, the Trust and the

Partnership and to seek their approval of any matters of change to the Property.
6.

Successors and Assigns. This Agreement and its provisions shall be binding upon

and inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, legal representatives, successors, and assigns of
each of the Parties.

419227.3
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7.

Memorandum of Agreement. Simultaneous with the execution of this Agreement,

the Parties shall execute and record the Memorandum of Agreement annexed as Exhibit "C".
8.

Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts and delivered by

facsimile.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this document as of the Effective
Date.
OSGUTHORPE

&&.- (®^^3ffifr*A

D. A. Osguthorpe/^

THE PARTNERSHIP:
D. A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP
By:.

MA.
D. A. OsguuiorpX Its Parther
*&*

1

S. OSGUTHORPE:

phen A. Osguthorpe,
THE TRUST:
THE DR. D.A. OSGUTHORPE TRUST

419227.3
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ASCU:
ASC UTAH, ING, A Maine corporation
By:
Name:. &LAt*&
Print Name:.
Title:

C & & * &

ayr-zrKnzv

4192273
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EXHIBIT A
TO
RESTATEMENT OF AGREEMENT
Legal Description
The following described property is located in Summit County, Utah and is more
particularly described as follows;

PARCEL 1:
Lots 3,4,5 and 6, Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
PARCEL 2:
Lots 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10 and the Southeast VA of Section 3, Township 2 South, Range 3 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

419227,3
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EXHIBIT B
TO
RESTATEMENT OF AGREEMENT
Property Map

4192273
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EXHIBIT C
TO
RESTATEMENT OF AGREEMENT
Memorandum of Agreement

419227.3
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WHEN RECORDED, PLEASE MAIL TO:
Parsons Behle & Larimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Post Office Box 45898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898
Attention: Shawn C. Ferrin
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that ASC Utah, Inc., a Maine corporation
("ASCU"); and D. A. Osguthorpe, the D. A Osguthorpe Family Partnership, D.A. Osguthorpe,
as trustee of The D.A. Osguthorpe Trust, and Stephen A. Osguthorpe ("collectively,
"Osguthorpe""), have entered into that certain Restatement of Agreement dated August 1, 2001
("Agreement"), which establishes, among other things, certain rights and obligations by and among
Osguthorpe and ASCU concerning a certain parcel of real property located in Summit County, Utah
and more particularly described on Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by tins
reference.
All of the terms and provisions of the Agreement are hereby incorporated herein by
reference. Additional information regarding the Agreement may be obtained by contacting any of
the following:
Party 1:

ASC Utah, Inc.
The Canyons
4000 The Canyons Resort Drive
Park City, Utah 84098
Attention: Managing Director

Party 2:

This Memorandum in no way modifies or amends the terms and provisions of the
Agreement This Memorandum is executed solely for the purpose of providing record notice of
the Agreement and is to be recorded in the real property records of Summit County, Utah.

419369^
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ADDENDUM 11

Page 1 of 1

56
Rule 56. Summary judgment.

(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may,
at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is
sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before
it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what
material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear
without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or
may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented
pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party
employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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Rule 64D. Garnishment.
(a) Availability of writ of garnishment (pre-judgment and after judgment). Except as provided in Rule 64A and as authorized and
permitted therein a writ of garnishment is available as provided for herein.
(a)(i) Before judgment. A writ of garnishment is available as a means of attachment before judgment, other than for defendant's
earnings from personal services as hereinafter defined in Subdivision (d)(vii), at any time after the filing of a complaint in cases
in which a writ of attachment is available under Rule 64C.
(a)(ii) After judgment or order. A writ of garnishment is available in aid of execution to satisfy a money judgment or other order
requiring the payment of money. Such judgments and orders are hereinafter sometimes referred to collectively as "judgment".
(a)(iii) Property subject to garnishment. The property subject to garnishment that a writ may be used to levy upon or affect is all
the accrued credits, chattels, goods, effects, debts, choses in action, money and other personal property and rights to property
of the defendant in the possession of a third person, or under the control or constituting a performance obligation to the
defendant of any third person, whether due or yet to become due at the time of service of the writ of garnishment, which are not
exempt from garnishment or exempt under any applicable provisions of state or federal law (hereinafter sometimes referred to
as "Property Subject to Garnishment").
(a)(iv) As used in this Rule 64D, the term "plaintiff" means the person or entity seeking by garnishment to attach or execute
upon the property of another subject to garnishment and the term "defendant" means the person or entity whose property
subject to garnishment is sought to be attached or executed upon by the plaintiff.
(b) Requirements for issuance of a prejudgment writ of garnishment. The clerk shall issue a prejudgment writ or writs of
garnishment, with or without notice to the defendant, directed to the person(s) sought to be charged as gamishee(s) and so
identified in the affidavit required by Subdivision (b)(i) herein only upon the order of the court in which the action is filed. Several
writs may be issued at the same time so long as there is only one named garnishee in a single writ. No writ shall issue unless
there is attached thereto the fee required by Subdivision (d)(ii). Subject to Rule 64A, the court shall issue its order for the
issuance of a prejudgment writ of garnishment only upon the occurrence of the following:
(b)(i) A finding that the plaintiff has filed with the clerk an affidavit briefly setting forth: admissible evidence of facts showing that
plaintiffs claim is one for which attachment is authorized by Rule 64C; the amount due the plaintiff for which the complaint seeks
judgment; that plaintiff has good reason to believe and does believe that defendant has Property Subject to Garnishment in the
possession or in the control of or otherwise owing from one or more specified third persons who plaintiff seeks to charge as
garnishees or that such third persons plaintiff seeks to charge as garnishees are otherwise indebted to the defendant; and that
such Property Subject to Garnishment is not earnings for the personal services of the defendant, or otherwise exempt from
garnishment.
(b)(ii) A finding that plaintiff has filed with the clerk a bond or undertaking in the form and amount required for the issuance of a
writ of attachment.
(b)(iii) Exceptions to the sufficiency of the sureties on plaintiffs prejudgment garnishment bond or undertaking and the
justification of such sureties shall be made within the times and in the manner and with the effect provided in Rule 64C(c).
(c) Requirements for issuance of writ of garnishment after judgment or other order. After the entry of a judgment or other order
requiring the payment of money, the clerk of any court from which execution thereon may be issued shall issue a writ or writs of
garnishment, without the necessity for an undertaking, upon the filing of an application by the plaintiff: (i) identifying the person
sought to be charged as a garnishee; (ii) stating whether such property consists in whole or in part of earnings from personal
services as hereinafter defined in Subdivision (d)(vii) of this rule and (iii) stating the remaining amount due on the judgment.
Several writs may be issued at the same time so long as there is only one named garnishee in a single writ. No writ shall issue
unless there is attached thereto the fee required by Subdivision (d)(ii).
(d) Content and effect of writ; to whom directed (pre-judgment or after judgment).
(d)(i) The writ of garnishment shall be issued in the name of the State of Utah and shall be directed to the person or persons
designated in the plaintiffs affidavit or application as garnishee or garnishees, advising each such person that each is attached
as garnishee in the action, and commanding each of them not to pay or deliver any non-exempt Property Subject to
Garnishment as defined in Subdivision (a)(iii) herein in their possession, custody or control, or part thereof, due or to become
due to the defendant up to the amount remaining due on the judgment (Subdivision (c)(iii)) if the writ is issued after judgment or
the amount claimed to be due the plaintiff (Subdivision (b)(0) if a prejudgment writ is issued, whichever is applicable, and to
retain possession and control of all such property until further order of the court or as otherwise discharged or released as
provided for herein. In the case of a prejudgment writ, the writ shall contain a designation that it is a prejudgment writ and further
note the date and time of expiration of the writ. At the time the writ of garnishment is issued, the clerk shall attach to the writ a
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notice of garnishment and exemptions, interrogatories to the garnishee and two copies of an application by which the defendant
may request a hearing.
(d)(ii) The writ shall require the garnishee to give answers to interrogatories within five (5) business days from the date of
service of the writ. Service of a copy of the answers to interrogatories shall be made upon the plaintiff and the original filed with
the clerk. The plaintiff shall provide a fee to the garnishee in an amount set by the Legislature. The interrogatories may in
substance inquire: (1) whether the garnishee is indebted to the defendant, either in property or in money, whether the same is
now due and, if not, when it is to become due; (2) whether there is any Property Subject to Garnishment in the possession,
custody or control of the garnishee and, if so, the value of the same; (3) whether the garnishee knows of any debts owing to the
defendant, whether due or not, or of any Property Subject to Garnishment belonging to the defendant or in which defendant has
an interest, whether in the possession or under the control of the garnishee or another, and, if so, the particulars thereof; (4)
whether the garnishee is retaining or deducting any amount in satisfaction of a claim the garnishee has against the plaintiff or
the defendant, a designation as to whom such claim relates, and the amount retained or deducted; and (5) as to any other
relevant information plaintiff may desire, including defendant's job, position or occupation, defendant's rate and method of
compensation, defendant's pay period and the computation of the amount of defendant's accrued disposable earnings attached
by the writ.
(d)(iii) If the garnishee has possession, custody or control of Property Subject to Garnishment, the garnishee shall serve within
five (5) business days of service of the writ of garnishment upon the garnishee a copy of the writ of garnishment, answers to
interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemptions, and two copies of an application by which a hearing may be requested,
upon: (1) the defendant at the last known address of the defendant shown on the records of the garnishee at the time the writ of
garnishment was served on the garnishee; and (2) upon any other person shown upon the records of the garnishee to be a coowner or having an interest in the property or money garnisheed at the last known address of the co-owner or other interested
person as shown on the records of the garnishee at the time the writ of garnishment was served on the garnishee. If that which
is garnisheed is an account, such as a bank account or the like, the copies of the writ of garnishment, answers to
interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemptions, and applications for hearing shall be served at the addresses maintained
in the records of the garnishee for that account. Service shall be by first class mail or by hand delivery to the defendant and all
others. In the answer to interrogatories, the garnishee shall state that the garnishee has mailed or hand delivered a copy of the
writ of garnishment, answers to interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemptions, and two copies of an application by
which a hearing may be requested to the defendant and all other persons entitled thereto and state the manner and date of
compliance therewith.
(d)(iv) The notice of garnishment and exemptions that is to be served upon the defendant and others entitled to its receipt shall
indicate in substance that certain money is exempt from garnishment including but not limited to, Social Security benefits,
Supplemental Security Income benefits, Veterans' benefits, unemployment benefits, Workers' Compensation benefits, public
assistance (welfare), alimony, child support, certain pensions, and part or all of wages or other earnings from personal services.
The notice shall also indicate that the defendant or other person notified must request a hearing within ten days from the date of
service of the notice upon the defendant or other person, but in no case later than the time at which the court orders the
disposition of the Property Subject to Garnishment provided for herein, which shall not be sooner than ten (10) days from the
service of the notice, if such defendant or other person desires to claim any exemption that has not already been reflected in the
answers to interrogatories, believes that the writ of garnishment was issued improperly, or that the answers to interrogatories
are inaccurate. For purposes of this provision, the date of service shall be the date of mailing, if mailed, or date of delivery, if
hand-delivered, and no period for mailing (Rule 6(e)) shall be used in computing the time period.
(d)(v) Priority among writs of garnishment served upon a garnishee shall be in order of their service.
(d)(vi) A writ of garnishment attaching earnings for personal services shall attach only that portion of the defendant's accrued
and unpaid disposable earnings hereinafter specified. The writ shall so advise the garnishee and shall direct the garnishee to
withhold from the defendant's accrued disposable earnings only the amount attached pursuant to the writ. Earnings for personal
services shall be deemed to accrue on the last day of the period in which they were earned or to which they relate. If the writ is
served before or on the date the defendant's earnings accrue and before the same have been paid to the defendant, the writ
shall be deemed to have been served at the time the periodic earnings accrued;
(d)(vii) "Earnings" or "earnings from personal services" means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether
denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or
retirement program. "Disposable earnings" means that part of a defendant's earnings remaining after the deduction of all
amounts required by law to be withheld. For purposes of a garnishment to enforce payment of a judgment arising out of a failure
to support dependent children, earnings also include, in addition to those items listed above, periodic payments pursuant to
insurance policies of any type, including unemployment compensation, insurance benefit payments, and all gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital assets or as otherwise
modified or adopted by law for the support of dependent children.
(d)(viii) The maximum portion of the aggregate disposable earnings of defendant (if an individual) becoming due the defendant
which is subject to garnishment is the lesser of:
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(d)(viii)(A) Twenty-five per centum of defendant's disposable earnings (fifty per centum for a garnishment to enforce payment of
a judgment arising out of failure to support dependent children) computed for the pay period for which the earnings accrued; or
(d)(viii)(B) The amount by which the defendant's aggregate disposable earnings computed for the pay period for which the
earnings accrued exceeds the number of weeks in the period multiplied by thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage
prescribed by the Fair Labor Standards Act in effect at the time the earnings are payable.
(d)(ix) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the garnishee shall treat the defendant's earnings becoming due from the
garnishee as the defendant's entire aggregate earnings for the purpose of computing the sum attached by the garnishment.
(e) Service of writ; return; general service (pre-judgment or after judgment). The writ, any order pursuant to subdivision(s) of this
rule, and any order pursuant to Rule 64A(3), shall be served upon the garnishee by a sheriff, constable, deputy, or such other
person designated by court order and return thereof made in the same manner as a return of service upon a summons. All other
service may be by first class mail or hand delivery.
(f) Release or discharge of garnishment (pre-judgment or after judgment). At any time either before or after the service of any
writ of garnishment, the defendant may obtain a release or discharge thereof in the same manner and under the same
conditions as a release or discharge of a writ of attachment may be obtained under the provisions of Subdivision (f) of Rule 64C.
The plaintiff may release a writ of garnishment by filing with the clerk a release of garnishment and serving a copy thereof upon
the garnishee.
(g) Answer of garnishee; delivery of property (pre-judgment or after judgment). The garnishee shall, within the time required by
Subdivision (d)(ii) hereof, serve upon the court and the plaintiff verified answers to the interrogatories and provide proof(s) of
service upon defendant of the copy of the writ of garnishment, answers to interrogatories, the notice of garnishment and
exemptions, and the applications by which a hearing may be requested, stating the manner and date of service. The garnishee
may also deliver to the officer serving the writ the Property Subject to Garnishment as shown by the answer of the garnishee,
and the officer shall make return of such property and money with the writ to the court, to be dealt with as thereafter ordered by
the court. Thereupon, the garnishee shall be relieved from further liability in the proceedings, unless the answer shall be
successfully controverted as hereinafter provided or the garnishee has willfully failed to serve copies of the writ of garnishment,
answers to interrogatories, notice of garnishment and exemptions, and the applications by which a request for a hearing may be
made on the defendant and other persons entitled thereto.
(h) Procedure (pre-judgment or after judgment). The defendant or any other person who owns or claims an interest in the
property subject to garnishment that is gamisheed may request a hearing to claim any exemption to the garnishment, or to
challenge the issuance of the writ or the accuracy of the answers to interrogatories. Such request must be filed within ten days
of the service (for purposes of this provision the date of service shall be the date of mailing if mailed or date of delivery if handdelivered and no period for mailing pursuant to Rule 6(e) shall be used in computing the time period) of the copy of the materials
required to be served by Subdivision (d)(iii) upon the defendant and all others entitled to receive the same. Any person filing a
request for hearing shall serve a copy of the request for hearing on the plaintiff, the garnishee, and other persons claiming an
interest in the property. The request for a hearing shall be in a form to enable the defendant or other person to specify the
grounds upon which the defendant or other person challenges the issuance of the writ or the accuracy of the answers to
interrogatories, or claims the amount garnisheed to be exempt, in whole or in part, including, but not limited to exemptions
claimed for Social Security benefits, Supplemental Security Income benefits, Veterans' benefits, unemployment benefits,
Workers' Compensation benefits, public assistance (welfare) benefits, alimony and child support, pensions, wage or other
earnings for personal service, and non-ownership of the garnisheed property. Where personal services are compensated, but
no amounts are required by law to be withheld, the amounts that would have been required to be withheld by law had the
defendant been an employee of the garnishee are exempt.
(h)(i) If no request for hearing is filed. If the garnishee does not receive a copy of a request for hearing within 20 days after
service of copies of materials required to be served by Subdivision (d)(iii), the garnishee shall pay Property Subject to
Garnishment to plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney. If a request for hearing is not filed as provided for in this Rule and the time for
doing so has expired and the writ issued was a prejudgment writ of garnishment, then the court or the clerk, upon plaintiffs
request, shall issue an order to the garnishee to pay the Property Subject to Garnishment into court by delivery of such property
to the sheriff or constable for that purpose. Property Subject to Garnishment that is paid into court pursuant to a prejudgment
writ of garnishment or at any time when a request for hearing has been filed shall be held by the clerk pending order of the
court.
(h)(ii) Effect of failure to request hearing. If the defendant or any other person to whom the materials required to be served by
Subdivision (d)(iii) fails to request a hearing as provided for herein, then defendant and such other persons shall be deemed to
have accepted as correct the garnishee's answers to interrogatories and the amounts stated therein to be not exempt from
garnishment except as reflected in the answers to interrogatories.
(h)(iii) If a request for hearing is filed. If a request for hearing is filed by or on behalf of the defendant or by any other person, the
court shall set the matter for hearing within ten (10) days from the filing of the request and serve notice of that hearing upon all
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parties and claimants by first class mail. If the court determines at the hearing that the writ was issued improperly, that the
answers to interrogatories are inaccurate, or that any assets garnisheed are exempt from or are not subject to garnishment, the
court shall immediately issue an order to the garnishee releasing such assets or portion thereof from the writ of garnishment. If
the court finds that the assets or a portion thereof are subject to garnishment and not exempt, it shall issue an order to pay the
Property Subject to Garnishment directly to plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney or as otherwise ordered by the court, except in the case
of a prejudgment writ of garnishment where the order shall require that such property be paid into court by delivery of such
property to the sheriff or constable for that purpose. Property Subject to Garnishment that is paid into court shall be held by the
clerk pending order of the court.
(h)(iv) If the property is other than money or its equivalent. Where the property is other than money or its equivalent, the court
shall order that the garnishee deliver such property to the sheriff, constable, deputy, or such other person designated by court
order. In the case of a writ issued after judgment, the person to whom the property was delivered shall sell as much of such
property as may be necessary to satisfy the judgment together with costs of the garnishment proceedings and deposit the
proceeds into court to be distributed by order of the court. Any surplus of such personal property or the proceeds thereof
necessary to satisfy the writ of garnishment shall be returned to the defendant unless otherwise ordered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. In the case of a prejudgment writ, the person to whom the property is delivered shall maintain possession of the
property until further order of the court.
(i) Reply to answer of garnishee; trial of issues; judgment (pre-judgment or after judgment). The plaintiff or defendant may,
within 10 days after the service of any answers to interrogatories, file and serve upon the garnishee and the other party to the
principal action a reply to the whole or any part thereof and may also allege any matters which would charge the garnishee with
liability except that all claims for exemptions to garnishment or non-ownership of property garnisheed shall be resolved under
the procedures as otherwise provided for in Subdivision (h) herein. Such new matter in reply shall be taken as denied and the
matter thus at issue shall be tried in the same manner as other issues of like nature. Judgment shall be entered upon the verdict
or finding the same as if the garnishee had answered according to such verdict or finding. Costs shall be awarded in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 54(d).
p) Proceedings on failure of garnishee to comply with rule (pre-judgment or after judgment). If a garnishee fails to answer
interrogatories after payment of the required fee, or if any garnishee shall fail to send to the defendant the copy of the writ,
answers to interrogatories, notice and applications required by Sections (d)(iii) of this Rule, the court may order the garnishee to
appear before the court and show cause why the garnishee should not be held in contempt therefor and why the court should
not order the garnishee to pay expenses and costs incurred by other parties to the proceeding as a result of garnishee's failure.
After the garnishee has been personally served with an order to appear before the court and show cause, the court may make
such orders as are just. Unless the court finds there was substantial justification for the garnishee's failure or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses or costs unjust, the court shall order the garnishee to pay reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees, incurred as a result of garnishee's failure.
If a garnishee fails to serve upon the court answers to interrogatories or an Affidavit of Garnishee as to Continuing Garnishment
but delivers to the court Property Subject to Garnishment, the plaintiff may obtain a release of such property by filing with the
court 60 days after the writ of garnishment was issued, or, in the case of a continuing garnishment, 60 days after the Property
Subject to Garnishment was delivered to the court, an Ex Parte Motion to Release Garnishment Funds and by mailing a copy of
the motion to the defendant. The motion shall state the amount of the property delivered to the court by the garnishee, that the
garnishee failed to answer the interrogatories or file an Affidavit of Garnishee as to Continuing Garnishment, that 60 days have
elapsed since the issuance of the writ (or, in the case of a continuing garnishment, 60 days have elapsed since the Property
Subject to Garnishment was delivered to the court), and that the defendant has made no objection to the garnishment. No
earlier than 10 days after a copy of the motion is mailed to the defendant, the court may enter an order that the Property Subject
to Garnishment shall be released to the plaintiff to be applied to the judgment against the defendant. If the defendant objects to
such release of property, the defendant shall file an objection to the motion with the court prior to the order being entered and
shall mail a copy of the objection to the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall mail a copy of the executed order to the defendant.
(k) Release of garnishee for amount paid (pre-judgment or after judgment). Except as provided for herein, a garnishee who acts
in accordance with this Rule shall be released from all demands by the defendant for all Property Subject to Garnishment that is
paid, delivered or accounted for by the garnishee pursuant to this Rule.
(I) Interpleader of third persons (pre-judgment or after judgment). When any person other than the defendant claims or may
claim that the property held in the possession, custody, or control of the garnishee pursuant to a Writ is not subject to
garnishment, the court may on motion order that such claimant be interpleaded as a defendant to the garnishment action, and if
not already subject to the jurisdiction of the court, provide for notice thereof, in such form as the court shall direct, together with
service of a copy of the order upon such third-party claimant in the manner required for the service of a summons. Thereupon
the garnishee may pay or deliver to the court such property held pursuant to the Writ, which shall be a complete discharge from
all liability to any party for the amount so paid or property so delivered. The third-party claimant shall thereupon be deemed a
defendant to the garnishment action and shall answer within 10 days, setting forth any claim or defense. In case of default,
judgment may be rendered as in any other cases of default which shall extinguish any claim of such third-party claimant.
(m) Claims of garnishee against plaintiff or defendant (pre-judgment or after judgment). Every garnishee shall be allowed to
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retain or deduct out of the Property Subject to Garnishment all demands against the plaintiff and against the defendant of which
the garnishee could have availed itself if the garnishee had not been served as garnishee, whether the same are at the time due
or not so long as the claims are liquidated, but only to the extent that the amounts retained and deducted are applied to reduce
a debt or other obligation of the plaintiff or defendant, except that should such property, otherwise subject to garnishment, be
held as security for the payment of a debt or other obligation of the defendant to the garnishee, then such property need not be
applied at that time but must remain subject to being applied at any time pending the payment in full of the debt or other
obligation. In answering the interrogatories propounded to the garnishee, the garnishee shall specify the amount retained or
deducted and the person against whom the claim is made. Amounts retained and deducted for amounts owed by the plaintiff to
the garnishee shall also be applied in reduction of any judgment amount rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. All
amounts properly garnisheed in excess of those amounts retained or deducted pursuant to this subdivision are subject to
payment and distribution in accordance with this Rule.
(n) Liability of garnishee on negotiable instruments (pre-judgment or after judgment). No person shall be liable as garnishee by
reason of having drawn, accepted, made or endorsed any negotiable instrument which is not in the possession, custody, or
control of the garnishee at the time of service of the writ of garnishment.
(o) When garnishee is mortgagee or pledgee (pre-judgment or after judgment). When any Property Subject to Garnishment is
mortgaged or pledged, or in any way held for the payment of a debt to the garnishee, the plaintiff may obtain an order from the
court authorizing the plaintiff to pay the total amount of the obligation to the garnishee in accordance with the terms of the
mortgage, pledge or obligation, and requiring the garnishee to deliver such Property Subject to Garnishment according to the
order of the court upon payment to such garnishee of the total obligation.
(p) Where property is held to secure performance of other obligation (pre-judgment or after judgment). If the Property Subject to
Garnishment secures any obligation other than the payment of money and if the obligation secured does not require the
personal performance of the defendant and can be performed by the plaintiff or its designee, the court may, upon plaintiffs
motion, authorize the plaintiff or its designee to perform the obligation or tender performance and that upon such performance,
or any tender thereof which is refused, the garnishee shall deliver the Property Subject to Garnishment in accordance with the
order of the Court.
(q) Disposition of property (pre-judgment or after judgment). The Property Subject to Garnishment under either Subdivision (o)
or (p) of this Rule or the proceeds from the sale thereof shall be applied to the extent available, first to satisfy any costs of sale,
then to repay any amount paid by the plaintiff to the garnishee to satisfy the obligation of the defendant to the garnishee, then to
pay the costs to perform the obligation of the defendant to the garnishee for an obligation other than the payment of money, and
then to satisfy the writ of garnishment.
(r) Order against garnishee for debt not due (pre-judgment or after judgment). When an order is made requiring a garnishee to
pay an amount to the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney or into court or otherwise provide property for disposition by the court and the
same is not yet due to the defendant, payment or providing of property shall not be required until such payment or property is
otherwise due the defendant from the garnishee.
(s) Failure to proceed against garnisheed property (pre-judgment or after judgment). Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Rule, if a plaintiff fails, within sixty days from the filing of the garnishee's answers to interrogatories, to secure and personally
serve on the garnishee an order requiring the garnishee to pay the property garnisheed into court or as otherwise provided
herein, then the writ, which commanded the garnishee to hold the amount or property, shall be released and the garnishee
discharged without further order of the court. If the Property Subject to Garnishment or any part thereof has been deposited with
the court and the writ of garnishment was issued in aid of the execution of a judgment or order for the payment of money, and
the plaintiff fails, within sixty days from the filing of the garnishee's answers to interrogatories, to request a release of the
property garnisheed from the court in accordance with Subdivision (h)(i), then the writ shall be released; the garnisheed property
shall be returned to the garnishee; and the garnishee discharged without further order of the court. Property Subject to
Garnishment deposited with the court pursuant to a prejudgment writ of garnishment shall be released only upon order of the
court. A release under this subdivision may be stayed upon order of the court for good cause shown. Such order shall not be
binding upon the garnishee until served upon it.
(t) Costs (pre-judgment or after judgment).
(t)(i) Costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the plaintiff and against the defendant in the pursuit of any garnishee action
instituted after judgment unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review
is taken, costs of the garnishee action shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the State of Utah, its
officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(t)(ii) The plaintiff must serve upon the defendant a copy of a memorandum of the items of necessary costs and disbursements
in the garnishee action or actions, and file with the court a like memorandum duly verified stating that the items are correct, the
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the garnishee action, and the items of costs have not been claimed in any
previous memorandum. The memorandum or memoranda may be filed at any time after judgment is rendered but in no event
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later than five days after the receipt of funds that would pay the judgment in full but for the payment of any costs associated with
a garnishee action for which a memorandum or memoranda have not been filed with the court. A party dissatisfied with the
costs claimed, may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs of the garnishee action, file a motion to have
the costs taxed by the court.
(t)(iii) All costs incurred in garnishee actions prior to the rendering of a judgment shall be taxed according to Rule 54(d) of these
rules.
(u)(i) A garnishment issued to enforce a judgment obtained by the Office of Recovery Services, within the Department of Social
Services, for repayment of overpayments, as defined in Utah Code Section 62A-11-202 or by the Department of Workforce
Services for repayment of overpayments as defined in Utah Code Section 35A-3-602, shall continue to operate and require the
garnishee to withhold the nonexempt portion of disposable earnings, as defined in Utah Code Subsection 62A-11-103(4), at
each succeeding earnings disbursement interval until the garnishment is released in writing by the court, the Office of Recovery
Services, or the Department of Workforce Services.
(u)(ii) The garnishment described in Subdivision (u)(i) may not exceed 25% of disposable earnings, as defined in Utah Code
Subsection 62A-11-103(4), or the amount permitted under Section 303(a) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 1673(a), whichever is less.
(v) Writ of continuing garnishment on earnings.
(v)(i) "Continuing garnishment" means any procedure for withholding the earnings of a defendant for successive pay periods for
payment of a judgment debt, other than a judgment for support. "Earnings" and "Disposable Earnings" shall have the meaning
set forth in Subdivision (d) of this rule. In addition to garnishment proceedings otherwise available under this rule, in any case in
which a money judgment is obtained in a court of competent jurisdiction, the plaintiff or plaintiffs assignee shall be entitled, in
accordance with this subdivision, to have the clerk of the court issue a writ of continuing garnishment against any garnishee who
may owe earnings to the defendant. The person who serves a writ of continuing garnishment, together with the notices required
by this rule, on the garnishee shall note the date and time of such service on the copy served. A writ of continuing garnishment
shall be subject to the same exemptions from garnishment and portion of aggregate disposable earnings of defendant subject to
garnishment as are described in Subdivision (d) of this rule.
(v)(ii) To the extent that the earnings are not exempt from garnishment, the writ of continuing garnishment shall be a continuing
lien on all disposable earnings due or to become due to the defendant from the date of service of the writ and continuing until
the earlier of the following events:
(v)(ii)(A) 120 days has expired from the date of service of the writ or, in the case of multiple garnishments, 120 days from the
date a garnishment becomes effective as described hereafter in Subdivision (v)(iii);
(v)(ii)(B) the end of the last pay period after the defendant's employment relationship is terminated;
(v)(ii)(C) the underlying judgment is stayed, vacated or satisfied in full;
(v)(ii)(D) the plaintiff releases the garnishment; or
(v)(ii)(E) the writ of continuing garnishment is dismissed, vacated, or stayed by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The plaintiff shall notify the garnishee in writing by first class mail within 5 days after a judgment is stayed, vacated, or satisfied
or a writ of continuing garnishment is dismissed, vacated, or stayed by the court.
(v)(iii) Only one writ of garnishment (continuing or otherwise) shall be in effect and satisfied at one time. When more than one
writ of garnishment has been issued against earnings due the same defendant and served on the same garnishee, the writs
shall be satisfied in the order of service on the garnishee. Upon expiration of a writ of continuing garnishment, as provided in
Subdivision (v)(ii) above, any other writ of continuing garnishment that has been issued and served upon a garnishee against
earnings due the defendant shall then become effective and shall continue for the period described in Subdivision (v)(ii) above.
No plaintiff may have issued more than one writ of continuing garnishment against the same earnings of any individual
defendant during the term of the lien created by any writ of continuing garnishment previously issued and served in favor of that
plaintiff. Any writ of continuing garnishment served upon a garnishee while any previous writ is still in effect shall be answered
by the garnishee with a statement that the garnishee has been served previously with one or more writs of garnishment against
earnings and specifying the date on which all such liens previously served are expected to terminate.
(v)(iv) Garnishee shall answer any interrogatories and serve upon the defendant information as required by Subdivisions (d) and
(g) of this rule. Thereafter, the defendant shall have the right to request a hearing as provided in Subdivision (h) of this rule. If
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garnishee does not receive a copy of a request for hearing within 20 days after service of copies of materials required to be
served by Subdivision (d)(iii), garnishee shall pay Property Subject to Garnishment from the first applicable pay period to plaintiff
or plaintiffs attorney. Any hearing requested by the defendant outside of that provided for in Subdivision (h) shall be requested
by motion to the court and held within the judge's sole discretion. Unless the writ shall terminate pursuant to Subdivision (v)(ii)
above or unless a request for hearing has been served on the garnishee but there has been no subsequent court order, within
10 days after the end of each subsequent pay period, the garnishee shall deliver the Property Subject to Garnishment either to
the plaintiff or to the plaintiffs attorney, together with an affidavit which shall state (1) whether the garnishee is indebted to the
defendant for earnings, specifying the beginning and ending dates of the applicable pay period, and the total earnings for the
pay period; (2) whether garnishee is retaining or deducting any amount in satisfaction of a claim the garnishee has against the
plaintiff or the defendant, a designation as to whom such claim relates, and the amount retained or deducted; (3) the
computation of the amount of defendant's accrued disposable earnings attached by the writ for the applicable pay period; and
(4) that garnishee has served defendant with a copy of the writ of garnishment and notice of garnishment and exemptions as
required by Subdivision (d) of this rule. Proceedings on failure of garnishee to comply with this Subdivision (v) shall follow
Subdivision (j) of this rule. Reply to any answer or affidavit of garnishee completed pursuant to this Subdivision (v) shall follow
Subdivision (i) of this rule.
(v)(v) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Subdivision (v), a writ of continuing garnishment issued to enforce a judgment
obtained by the Office of Recovery Services, within the Department of Social Services, shall have priority over any other writ of
continuing garnishment in accordance with Subdivision (u) of this rule. If a writ of continuing garnishment issued by the Office of
Recovery Services is served during the term of a lien created by any other writ of continuing garnishment, the term of that lien
shall be tolled and all priorities preserved until the expiration of the Office of Recovery Services writ.
(v)(vi) The plaintiff shall be responsible for insuring that the amounts garnished do not exceed the amount due on the judgment.
(v)(vii) Except as specifically noted in this Subdivision (v), all other provisions of this rule apply to this subdivision.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.
AMERICAN SECURITY BANK, N.A., Plaintiff,
v.
John C. YORK, Jr., et al., Defendants.
John C. YORK, Jr., et al., Counterclaimants,
v.
AMERICAN SECURITY BANK, N.A.,
Counterdefendant.
Civ. A. No. 91-1212(GHR).
Sept. 1,1992.
Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Johanna F. Chanin, Colton and
Boykin, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
David R. Kunev. Paul A. Kaplan, David & Hagner,
P.C.,
Washington,
D.C.,
for
defendants/counterclaimants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
REVERCOMB, District Judge.
*1 This matter is before the Court on plaintiff and
counterdefendant American Security Bank, N.A.'s
("ASB") Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants
and counterclaimants are John C. York, Jr. ("York"),
Michael I. Lipson ("Lipson"), Geraldine A. York, and
Ronnie H. Lipson. Ms. York and Ms. Lipson are the
spouses, respectively, of John C. York, Jr. and
Michael I. Lipson. ASB seeks summary judgment
on its action to recover $12,000,000.00 plus accrued
interest, late charges, reasonable attorneys fees and
costs based on defendants' default upon a promissory
note. Plaintiffs also seek summary judgment on the
counterclaim, which alleges breach of contract,
promissory estoppel, and breach of duty of good faith
on the part of ASB. Jurisdiction rests upon the
parties' diversity of citizenship. Upon consideration
of the parties' briefs, supporting documents, and oral
arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, the
Court will deny plaintiffs Motion.
I. American Security Bank's Claim
Copr.© West2004No<
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ASB's claim arises out of a promissory note ("the
Note") in the principal amount of $13,500,000, which
York, Lipson, and their spouses executed and
delivered to ASB on January 31, 1989. Defendants
subsequently executed and delivered, on March 30,
1990, an amended and restated note ("the Amended
Note") in the same principal amount, which provided
for eleven quarterly payments of principal in
installments of $400,000.00 each, with the first
payment to be made on March 31, 1991. It is
undisputed that defendants failed to make the first
$400,000 payment. Under the terms of the Amended
Note, this default, which to the Court's knowledge
has not been cured, triggered a 5% late charge on the
delinquent payment, an acceleration clause for the
entire principal amount, and a provision obligating
defendants to pay costs of collection, including
reasonable attorneys fees.
Notwithstanding this default, the Court believes that
summary judgment in ASB's favor is inappropriate
because defendants have raised a genuine issue of
material fact on their Equal Credit Opportunity Act
defense through the affidavits and depositions
accompanying their opposition to plaintiffs Motion.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. All U.S. 317. 324
(1986): Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Put differently, the
Court is well satisfied, having reviewed the parties'
briefs and supporting documentation, that there is
considerably more than a "scintilla" of evidence in
defendants' favor, thus precluding this Court from
saying that plaintiffs "must prevail as a matter of
law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.. All U.S. 242.
251-52(1976).
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15
U.S.C. § § 1691-1691f. provides in pertinent part
that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any creditor to
discriminate against any applicant, with respect to
any aspect of a credit transaction ... on the basis of...
sex or marital status." 15 U.S.C. S 1691(a)(1). The
Federal Reserve Board, pursuant to the ECOA, 15
U.S.C. § 1691b(a). has promulgated Regulation B,
which provides that "a creditor shall not require the
signature of an applicant's spouse or other person,
other than a joint applicant, on any credit instrument
if the applicant qualifies under the creditor's
standards of creditworthiness for the amount and
terms of the credit requested."
12 C.F.R. §
202.7(d)(1) (1992) (emphasis added). The statute
defines an "applicant" as meaning "any person who
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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applies to a creditor directly for an extension,
renewal, or continuation of credit, or applies to a
creditor indirectly by use of an existing credit plan
for an amount exceeding a previously established
credit limit." 15 U.S.C. S 1691aCb1. The Federal
Reserve Board, by regulation, has included in this
definition persons who have received extensions of
credit, as well as those applying for credit in the first
instance. See 12 C.F.R. S 2Q2.2fe-> (1992V fFNll
*2 Defendants put forward facts showing that York
and Lipson became applicants for a $13,500,000 loan
from ASB, which was the basis of the Note of
January 31, 1989, through discussions with Larry
Pendleton, a Vice President of ASB with supervisory
responsibilities for the bank's Mortgage Warehousing
Division. See York Aff. f 6; York Dep. at 100-01;
Pendleton Dep. at 6.
At the time they became
applicants for this loan, York and Lipson were the
sole owners of York Associates, which was engaged
in the origination, sale, and servicing of multifamily
housing mortgages. See York Aff. \ f 2-3. York
and Lipson also owned substantially all of the stock
of First Commonwealth Savings Bank ("First
Commonwealth"), a Virginia savings and loan
institution. See id. f 6. York Associates was a
customer of ASB during the 1980s, having opened a
line of credit with ASB's Mortgage Warehousing
Division in 1983 for use in York Associates'
mortgage banking business. See id. \ f 3-4.
It was through this business relationship with ASB
that York came to discuss with Larry Pendleton, the
ASB banker, York Associates' need for a loan to put
additional capital into the firm. See id. f 6.
According to York's sworn affidavit and his
deposition testimony, Pendleton expressed an interest
in ASB making this loan to York Associates and
indicated that ASB would not require that York and
Lipson pledge their shares in First Commonwealth
stock as collateral, which York and Lipson were
reluctant to do. See id.; York Dep. at 100-01.
York's testimony, however, is that, at the time this
loan was discussed, Pendleton stated that ASB would
require the signatures of Geraldine York and Ronnie
Lipson, as well as those of their husbands, before it
would make the loan. See York Dep. at 101; York
Aff. U 7. This requirement was imposed apparently
before ASB had undertaken any study of the
creditworthiness of the applicants York and Lipson.
ASB has not disputed that its officer required the
signatures of Ronnie Lipson and Geraldine York
before the bank undertook an analysis of York's and
Lipson's creditworthiness or that York and Lipson
met its standards of creditworthiness for this
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particular loan.
Rather, ASB suggests that the
defendants were joint applicants and that the loan
was "used in substantial part to pay off an alreadyexisting personal loan to all four borrowers, including
Mrs. York and Mrs. Lipson." PL's Reply at 4.
Defendants have produced evidence that the loan
was a loan to York Associates, in which Ms. York
and Ms. Lipson had no ownership interest and played
no role in the loan negotiations. See York Aff. f f
2, 5, 9; Carlson Dep. at 24; Rice Dep. at 28;
Geraldine York Dep. at 85. Defendants have also
produced evidence suggesting that ASB did not
seriously look to the personal assets of Ronnie
Lipson and Geraldine York or to assets held jointly
with their husbands as sources of repayment. ASB's
account officer for York Associates, Lisa F. Carlson,
testified in her deposition that, at the time the loan
was initially made, ASB looked chiefly for collateral
to the anticipated sale of York Associates to
Dominion International PLC and then to the sale of
the firm's servicing portfolio, considering the Yorks'
and Lipsons' personal income and assets only as a
tertiary source of repayment. See Carlson Dep. at
31,
33.
A
contemporaneous
inter-office
communication from Lisa Carlson, outlining the
details of the $13,500,000 loan to York Associates,
confirms that ASB looked primarily for repayment to
the sale of the firm, and does not mention at all the
joint personal assets of the Yorks and the Lipsons or
the assets of Geraldine York and Ronnie Lipson as
sources of collateral.
See Defs.' Exh. I (dated
January 18, 1989). When the anticipated sale of the
firm to Dominion PLC fell through and the loan's
terms were renegotiated, the parties ultimately agreed
that York and Lipson would pledge their shares in
First Commonwealth as collateral for the Amended
Note. See PL's Exh. 14 (Stock Pledge Agreement
dated March 30, 1990); Carlson Dep. at 78.
*3 Not only does the evidence above suggest that
Ms. York and Ms. Lipson were not joint applicants, it
also suggests that York and Lipson qualified "under
the creditor's standards of creditworthiness for the
amount and terms of the credit requested." 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.7(d)(1). Were a trier of fact to agree with
defendants' characterization of the facts, it would
follow that ASB violated the ECOA when it required
the signatures of Ms. Lipson and Ms. York on the
1989 Note and the 1990 Amended Note. See Marine
American State Bank v. Lincoln. 433 N.W.2d 709,
712 (Jowa 1988). While a fuller development of the
record may convince a trier of fact that ASB's
characterization of the loan is accurate, at this stage
of the litigation it is not the task of the Court to
"weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
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matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial." Anderson. All U.S. at 249.
ASB's other objections to defendants' ECOA defense
are unpersuasive. While it may be true, as plaintiff
argues, that the intent of the ECOA was to protect
married women who sought credit independent of
their husbands, it has long been held that the plain
language of the statute outlaws discrimination
"against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a
credit transaction, which is based on marital status."
Markham v. Colonial Morteaee Serv. Co.. Assocs..
Inc.. 605 F.2d 566. 569 (T>.C.Cir.l9791.
The Court is also unpersuaded mat paragraphs 5 and
9 of the opinion letter issued by defendants' counsel,
or the attached certification, constitute admissions on
the part of defendants that ASB complied with the
provisions of the ECOA.
The tenor of those
documents is that execution of the loan documents
will not violate any duty imposed on the borrowers,
while paragraph 5(a) of the opinion letter states that
"[t]he enforceability [of the loan documents, security
documents and the credit facility letter] may be
limited by ... other laws of general applicability
affecting the rights of creditors." PL's Exh. 10, at 6
(emphasis added). The ECOA is just such a law.
Finally, while the parties agree that the ECOA may
be raised as an affirmative defense, see In re
Remimton. 19 B.R. 718. 719-20 (D.Colo. 19821.
plaintiff contends that defendants' assertion of this
defense must fail because they have not alleged
damages or requested relief under the Act. See PL's
Reply at 3. On the contrary, the Answer of York and
Lipson to the Amended Complaint plainly indicates
that the ECOA is being asserted as a defense to
liability on the Amended Note.
The statute,
moreover, provides for equitable and declaratory
relief if necessary to enforce the Act's requirements.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1961e(c). While one court has
found no authority for the proposition that a violation
of the ECOA renders an instrument void, see
Diamond v. Union Bank and Trust of Bartlesville.
116 F.Supp. 542. 544 fN.D.Okl. 19911. that court did
not consider the language or effect of section
1691e(c). The question whether the ECOA may be
asserted as a defense to liability has not been
addressed by our court of appeals and this Court is
unprepared, in the face of the broadly remedial
language of section 1961e(c), to say that such a
defense must fail as a matter of law. The assertion
of an ECOA defense, moreover, has been found to
support an award of damages in the nature of
recoupment in the event a violation of the Act is
found. See In re Remimton. 19 B.R. at 720-21:

Marine American State Bank. 433 N.W.2d at 712.
In short, the Court is of the view that defendants'
assertion of an ECOA defense entitles them, at the
very least, to put on proof of damages by way of
recoupment in the event it is proved that ASB
violated the Act.
*4 Thus, on review of the record before it, the Court
finds that defendants have pointed to disputed issues
of material fact regarding ASB's possible violation of
the ECOA which show the need for a trial and which
warrant denial of plaintiffs summary judgment
motion.
The Court will also deny summary
judgment on the issue of plaintiffs damage claim,
because defendants have disputed the amount of
interest and reasonable attorneys' fees. See Lipson

Aff.lf 3-6.
II. The Counterclaim
ASB also seeks summary judgment on defendants'
and counterclaimants' counterclaim for breach of
contract, promissory estoppel and breach of the duty
of good faith. In brief, the counterclaim alleges that
York and Lipson agreed to pledge their shares in First
Commonwealth as additional collateral for the
Amended Note upon the understanding and promise
that ASB would subsequently assist them in the
formation of a holding company to own First
Commonwealth stock and would agree to a stock
swap of First Commonwealth shares for shares in the
holding company. York and Lipson claim that, after
they had pledged their First Commonwealth shares
and executed the Amended Note, ASB reneged on its
promise.
There is no dispute that the alleged
promise to York and Lipson was made, if at all,
orally.
Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment because the loan documents-including the
Amended Note and Stock Pledge Agreementconstitute a fully integrated agreement, against which
parol evidence of an alleged prior oral side agreement
inconsistent with the terms of the loan documents is
inadmissible. See PL's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for
SummJ. at 21-23; PL's Reply at 13-16. That would
be the case if the evidence showed that the parties
intended the loan documents to constitute the entire
contract. See Dominion Bank. N.S. v. Moore. 688
F.SUPP. 1084. 1086 (W.D.Va. 19881: Stamenich v.
Markovic. 462 A.2d 452. 455 (D.C.APP.19831:
Giotis v. Lampkin. 145 A.2d 779. 781
(D.CMun.App.19581. Under the theory of partial
integration, however, parol evidence would be
admissible to prove the agreement alleged in the
counterclaim if the language and conduct of the
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parties and the surrounding circumstances showed
that the parties did not intend "that the writing
embrace their agreement on the subject in question."
Giotis. 145 A.2d at 781. 782.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that neither
the Note, nor the Amended Note, nor the Stock
Pledge Agreement contains an integration clause like
that in the case cited by plaintiff. See Dominion
Bank. 688 F.Supp. at 1086. While the absence of
such a clause is merely probative on the question of
the parties' intent, defendants and counterclaimants
provide additional evidence in affidavits and
depositions on the interrelation of the loan and the
agreement that is the subject of the counterclaim.
Specifically, defendants and counterclaimants submit
evidence that, prior to the execution of the Amended
Note in March of 1990, York and Lipson were
attempting to form the bank holding company for
First Commonwealth and requested that the
restructuring of the ASB loan be delayed until the
holding company could be formed and approved by
government regulators, at which point they would
pledge stock in the holding company as collateral for
the restructured loan. See York Aff. % 1 18-22;
York Dep. at 212, 214; Carlson Dep. at 111-12.
York has testified that, at the request of Larry
Pendleton, he and Lipson agreed to pledge First
Commonwealth stock because ASB wanted to
restructure the loan prior to an impending bank
examination. See York Aff. | f 23-25; York Dep.
at 230-32, 300-01; Lipson Dep. at 102-03. In
agreeing to restructure the loan before the holding
company could be formed, York claims to have relied
on his longstanding relationship of trust and course of
dealing with Pendleton, as well as the oral assurances
of ASB's president, that the bank would subsequently
help York and Lipson form the holding company and
agree to a stock swap. See York Aff. f f 224-30;
York Dep. at 227, 300-01; Lipson Dep. at 103-05;
Rice Dep. at 92-93, 94. According to York, after the
execution of the Amended Note ASB declined to
assist in the formation of the holding company and
refused to release its lien on First Commonwealth
shares so that the stock swap could take place. See
York Dep. at 243-44, 252-55. Viewing these factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Luian v. National Wildlife Ass'n.
110 S.Ct. 3177. 3188 (1990). the Court is satisfied
that defendants and counterclaimants have raised
material issues of triable fact both as to intent of the
parties and to the very existence of the oral
agreement. Summary judgment on the counterclaim
is therefore inappropriate.
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plaintiff ASB's Motion for Summary Judgment on its
Amended Complaint and the Counterclaim is
DENIED.
The Court will hold a status conference at 9:00 a.m.
on October 27, 1992, at which counsel for the parties
shall attend, for the purpose of setting a trial date.
SO ORDERED.
FN1. This definition reads as follows:
Applicant means any person who requests or
who has received an extension of credit
from a creditor, and includes any person
who is or may become contractually liable
regarding an extension of credit.
For
purposes of § 202.7(d). the term includes
guarantors, sureties, endorsers and similar
parties.
12C.F.R.S 202.2(e) (1992).
1992 WL 237375,1992 WL 237375 (D.D.C.)
END OF DOCUMENT

*5 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above,
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Enoch Richard Smith, as personal representative of the Estate of
Enoch Smith Jr., Plaintiff and Appellee, v. D.A. Osguthorpe, an
individual; and D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership, Defendants and
Appellants.
Case No. 20010530-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2002 UT App 361; 58 P.3d 854; 459 Utah Adv. Rep. 22; 2002 Utah
App. LEXIS 110
October 31,2002, Filed

PRIOR HISTORY:
[***1] Third District, Salt Lake Department.
The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki.
DISPOSITION:
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in
part.
COUNSEL:
David W. Scofield, Salt Lake City, for
Appellants.
Hardin A. Whitney and Robert G. Wing, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee.
JUDGES:
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge.
WE CONCUR: Norman H. Jackson, Presiding
Judge, William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.

BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
[*P1]
D.A. Osguthorpe and the D.A.
Osguthorpe Family Partnership (collectively
the Osguthorpes) appeal the district court's
grant of Enoch Richard Smith's motions for
summary judgment and denial of the
Osguthorpes' motions for summary judgment,
to dismiss, and to amend. We affirm in part,
and reverse and remand in part.

BACKGROUND
[*P2] Prior to 1966, Enoch Smith Jr. (Smith)
nl and D.A. Osguthorpe (Osguthorpe) were
partners in a cattle and sheep business (the
partnership). In November 1966, Smith and
Osguthorpe entered into an agreement (the
dissolution agreement) "to settle all of the
rights between them in the partnership
businesses and affairs."

OPINIONBY:
Judith M. Billings
OPINION:
[**855]

nl Enoch Richard Smith filed this
action as the representative of the estate
of his father, Enoch Smith Jr., who died
on November 11, 1996. For convenience
we refer to the two as Smith.
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[* * *2]
[*P3] Under the dissolution agreement, Smith
agreed to sell Osguthorpe his interest in the
partnership assets, subject to a reservation by
Smith of a share of proceeds derived from the
sale or lease of property (the disputed
property), which is the subject of this appeal. In
return, Osguthorpe agreed to pay Smith $
50,000 and to assume partnership obligations.
[*P4] Smith and Osguthorpe signed the
dissolution agreement. Additionally,
Osguthorpe's wife signed under a clause
providing that "I... agree that any interest that I
may have in and to the [disputed property]
[**856] shall be subject to the provisions of
said paragraph 1 (g)" of the dissolution
agreement. In January 1967, the dissolution
agreement was recorded in the Summit County
Recorder's Office.
[*P5]
Sometime after entering into the
dissolution agreement, Osguthorpe conveyed
part of the disputed property to the D.A.
Osguthorpe Family Partnership (the family
partnership). The family partnership included
Osguthorpe's son Stephen.
[*P6] On August 14, 1996, Osguthorpe and
the family partnership entered into a twentyeight-year agreement with Wolf Mountain
Resorts, L.C. (Wolf Mountain) titled [***3]
"Lease Agreement" (the lease). Under the
lease, Wolf Mountain agreed to annually pay
the Osguthorpes $ 100,000 to "lease[] ...
specific portions" of the Osguthorpes' property,
including the disputed property, "for use as a
commercial recreation area, including the
installation, maintenance and operation of two
ski lifts, snow making and clearing of ski trails
and such other related facilities, structures and
roads as may be required." The lease also
required Wolf Mountain to permit the
Osguthorpes "to improve and to use" the

property provided the Osguthorpes did "not
interfere with ski lifts and similar structures
and runs of Wolf Mountain.
[*P7] Sometime in 1997, American Skiing
Company (the Canyons) succeeded to Wolf
Mountain's interest in the lease. On July 28,
1997, the Canyons, Osguthorpe, the family
partnership, and Stephen, as an individual,
amended the lease. This first amendment
granted the Canyons the right to construct a ski
trail, and the right to repair and construct
additional roads and relocate and upgrade lifts
subject to the approval of Stephen and the
Canyons' director. The amendment required the
Canyons to "include the Osguthorpes in their
master planning [***4]
process." The
amendment also increased the annual rent to $
150,000.
[*P8] On August 10, 1998, the lease was
amended a second time. This second
amendment gave the Canyons the right to have
alpine skiing operations and to construct
another road subject to the approval of Stephen
and the Canyons* director. The Osguthorpes
retained the right to use and improve all of the
property for their sheep and cattle ranching
operations, so long as the same did not damage
the Canyons' facilities or unreasonably interfere
with the Canyons' winter use of the property.
The amendment increased the annual payment
to $ 200,000.
[*P9] In November 1998, Enoch Richard
Smith, as representative of Enoch Smith Jr.'s
estate, brought a breach of contract action
against the Osguthorpes, seeking a share of the
lease payments. Smith filed a motion for partial
summary judgment, contending the dissolution
agreement entitled him to a share of the lease
payments. The Osguthorpes filed a crossmotion for summary judgment, contending the
dissolution agreement was unenforceable.
Following a hearing, the district court granted
Smith's motion for partial summary judgment.
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[*P10] Thereafter, [***5] the Osguthorpes'
counsel withdrew and newly associated counsel
filed a motion to reconsider the grant of partial
summary judgment to Smith, asserting the
dissolution agreement was unenforceable for
want of consideration and under the statute of
frauds. The Osguthorpes' new counsel also
filed a second motion to amend their answer to
assert, inter alia, fraud defenses and
counterclaims. The district court denied the
Osguthorpes' motion to reconsider, ruling that
the dissolution agreement was integrated and
satisfied the statute of frauds. The district court
did not address the Osguthorpes' motion to
amend.
[*Pll] Smith filed a second motion for
summary judgment seeking damages of onehalf of the lease payments in excess of $ 1.60
per acre. In response, the Osguthorpes asserted
the lease payments were mainly for services
rendered by Osguthorpe and Stephen, thus a
material issue of fact existed as to the
allocation of payments due Smith. The district
court granted Smith's requested damages,
concluding the lease payments were entirely for
use of the disputed property not for services.
[*P12] The Osguthorpes then filed a motion
to dismiss for failure to join Stephen and
[***6] the Canyons as indispensable parties.
The district court refused to grant or deny the
motion. Instead, the court ruled that although
[**857] the Canyons and Stephen did not have
an interest in Smith's action generally, they had
an interest with respect to its ruling that the
lease payments were not for services. The court
therefore invited the Canyons and Stephen to
file memoranda in opposition to Smith's second
motion for summary judgment.
[*P13] The Osguthorpes now appeal the grant
of Smith's motions for summary judgment and
the denial of their motions for summary
judgment, to dismiss, and to amend their
answer.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

[*P14] The Osguthorpes argue the district
court erred in granting Smith's motions for
summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate only
when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In determining
whether the [district] court correctly found that
there was no genuine issue of material fact, we
accept the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the [nonmoving] party. In deciding
whether the [district] court correctly granted
judgment [***7] as a matter of law, we give
no deference to the [district] court's view of the
law; we review it for correctness.
SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett,
Stainback & Assocs., 2001 UT 54, P9, 28 P.3d
669 (second alteration in original) (quotations
and citations omitted).
[*P15] The Osguthorpes also argue the district
court erred in not ordering joinder of Stephen
and the Canyons. We review the district court's
"rule 19 determination under an abuse of
discretion standard." Grand County v. Rogers,
2002 UT 25, P27, 44 P.3d 734. However, the
district court's "interpretation of... rule [19] is a
question of law that we review for correctness."
Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, PI5, 16 P.3d
540. n2
n2 The Osguthorpes additionally
argue the district court exceeded its
discretion in failing to grant their second
motion to amend. However, they fail to
explain why the district court exceeded
its discretion. They instead appear to ask
this court to order the district court to
allow amendment on remand. As Smith
correctly notes, the Osguthorpes have the
option to seek amendment on remand.
See Call v. West Jordan City, 727 P.2d
180, 181 (Utah 1986) (noting pleadings
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is what it appears to be." Id.; see also Terry's
may be amended after remand "within
Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur II, 618 P.2d 29, 32
the sound discretion of the [district] court
(Utah 1980) ("Where parties have various
so long as they do not cover issues
claims
and obligations to each other, and have
specifically foreclosed by the appellate
had a discussion about resolving their disputes
court").
which results in a written [**858] agreement
signed by them, it is generally to be assumed
[***8]
that their disputes were merged into the written
ANALYSIS
agreement."). Further, a district court is not
precluded
from ruling that an agreement is
I. Is the Dissolution Agreement
integrated in granting a motion for summary
Enforceable?
judgment. If the "contract terms are complete,
clear, and unambiguous [, they can] be
[*P16] The Osguthorpes raise a number of
interpreted by the judge on a motion for
issues in contending the district court erred in
summary judgment." Webb v. R.O.A. Gen.,
enforcing the dissolution agreement. We
Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
consider each issue but conclude the district
(quotations and citation omitted). We cannot
court did not err in concluding the dissolution
say the district court erred in determining from
agreement is enforceable.
the unambiguous terms of the dissolution
agreement that it is integrated. n3
A. Consideration of Parol Evidence in
Determining the Dissolution Agreement is
Integrated
n3 It is unclear whether the district
court considered the parol evidence
offered by the Osguthorpes in
[*P17] The parol evidence rule "operates in
determining
that the dissolution
the absence of fraud to exclude [prior and]
agreement
is
integrated.
However, even
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or
if we were to conclude that the parol
representations offered for the purpose of
evidence was admissible to determine if
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated
the
dissolution agreement is integrated
contract." Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d
and the court erred in not considering it,
663, 665 (Utah 1985) (emphasis omitted). "An
we
conclude any error was harmless. The
agreement is integrated where the parties
parol
evidence does not establish that the
thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final
dissolution
agreement is not integrated.
and complete expression of the agreement." Eie
v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1194
In his affidavits, Osguthorpe attested
(Utah 1981) (quotations and citation omitted).
that in 1966, he and Smith orally agreed
to dissolve the partnership. Thereafter, he
[*P18]
"[A] court must first determine
tendered $ 50,000 to Smith who accepted
whether the writing was intended by the parties
the payment. A few weeks later, Smith's
to be an integration. In resolving this
attorney contacted Osguthorpe to sign
preliminary question of fact, parol evidence,
the dissolution agreement, which
indeed any relevant [***9]
evidence, is
Osguthorpe reviewed. Osguthorpe also
admissible." Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665
attested that the $ 50,000 he paid Smith
(emphasis added). However, to preserve the
was equal to or greater than the then
integrity of written contracts, we apply "a
current market value of Smith's
rebuttable presumption that a writing which on
partnership interest and Osguthorpe
its face appears to be an integrated agreement
received no consideration for signing the
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dissolution agreement. This testimony is
not persuasive on the issue of integration.
[***10]
[*P19] The dissolution agreement provides
that the parties "now desire to settle all of the
rights between them." (Emphasis added.)
Further, the agreement requires Osguthorpe to
pay $ 50,000 to Smith within thirty days of the
date of the agreement and "upon payment in
full" requires Smith to execute and deliver
assignments, deeds, and bills of sale necessary
to convey his interest in the partnership
businesses. Each party also agrees to "release
and discharge" the other from all claims arising
out of the partnership. We conclude the
unambiguous language establishes that the
dissolution agreement is integrated.
B. Consideration
Agreement

for

the

Dissolution

[*P20] Next, the Osguthorpes argue that
although in the dissolution agreement Smith
purports to convey his interest in the disputed
property, Smith had nothing to convey as
Osguthorpe was at all times the owner of the
property. Thus, they argue Smith's promise to
sell subject to a reservation when he had no
interest to sell does not "suffice for
consideration."
[*P21] The dissolution agreement provides:
Except as hereinafter reserved to [Smith],
[Smith] agrees to sell to [Osguthorpe] all
[***11] of [Smith's] right, title, interest and
estate in and to all partnership assets, and
[Osguthorpe] agrees to purchase from [Smith]
all of his said right, title, interest and estate in
and to all partnership assets upon the following
terms and conditions, to-wit:
1. The partnership assets and properties
covered hereby shall include:
....(g) In addition to the above described

property, [Smith] agrees to sell to
[Osguthorpe], his interest in the following
described real property located in Summit
County, Utah, subject, however, to the
reservation of interests therein by [Smith] as
hereinafter specifically set forth:
[property description in metes and bounds].
(Emphasis added.)
[*P22] The district court concluded the
disputed property was a partnership asset based
upon this declaration. We agree. Subparagraph
(l)(g) falls under the paragraph providing that
Osguthorpe "agrees to purchase ... all
partnership assets upon the following terms and
conditions," and paragraph (1) providing that
"the partnership assets and properties covered
hereby shall include," and then listing the
partnership properties. (Emphasis added.) In
subparagraph [***12] (l)(g), Smith agrees to
sell "his interest in the following described real
property." (Emphasis added.) Smith and
Osguthorpe were agreeing that certain
properties were [**859] partnership properties
to the exclusion of other properties. n4
n4 The Osguthorpes argue the district
court erred in refusing to consider parol
evidence offered to support their
contention that Smith's promise to sell
the disputed property was illusory. Smith
responds that because the dissolution
agreement unambiguously declares that
the disputed property was partnership
property and Smith had an interest in
such property, parol evidence is
inadmissible. The Utah Supreme Court
has recognized that parol evidence is
admissible to show lack or want of
consideration, see
Union Bank v.
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah
1985), and failure of consideration, see
Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454,
456 (Utah 1982). But see Last Chance
Ranch, Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25
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P.2d 952, 958 (1933) ("If the
consideration stated appears as a clear
and unambiguous statement of part of the
agreement, representing an actual
contractual term and something more
than a mere formal requisite, such a term
of the contract must be regarded in the
same light as any other material term of
the contract and extrinsic evidence to
vary or contradict it is inadmissible[.]"
(Quotations and citation omitted.)). In his
affidavit, Osguthorpe attested that he
never transferred nor intended to transfer
ownership of the disputed property to
Smith or the partnership, nor is there any
signed, delivered, or recorded deed doing
the same. However, Utah's Partnership
Act acknowledges that property may be
conveyed to a partnership without
transferring title. See Utah Code Ann. §
§ 48-1-5, 48-1-7 (1998). Additionally,
the dissolution agreement was recorded.
We thus conclude that even considering
the extrinsic evidence, there is no
material issue of fact that precludes
summary judgment. Our conclusion is
further supported by the fact that
Osguthorpe's wife signed the dissolution
agreement under the clause providing, "I
... agree that any interest that I may have
in and to the [disputed property] shall be
subject to the provisions of said
paragraph 1 (g)."

that is required is that the interest be granted or
declared by a writing subscribed by the party to
be charged." Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d
196, 450 P.2d 467, 469 (1969) (concluding
letter stating partner was entitled to ten percent
interest in partnership assets, consisting of
leaseholds and interest in lands, satisfied statute
of frauds) (emphasis added). The district court
ruled that because the dissolution agreement
declared the disputed property to be partnership
property and it was signed by Osguthorpe, the
party to be charged, the statute of frauds was
satisfied. We agree with the district court that
the dissolution agreement suffices to show that
Smith had an interest in the property and
therefore the dissolution agreement is
supported by consideration. n5
n5 The Osguthorpes also argue
Smith's promise to sell some undefined
"interest" in the property fails for lack of
specificity under the statute of frauds.
"[A] real property interest may be
transferred through [a deed or] other
documents and memoranda revealing an
intent to transfer an interest in real
property." Warburton v. Virginia Beach
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779,
781 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Given that
Smith promised to sell his entire interest
in the partnership property, we conclude
the statute of frauds is satisfied.
r***j4]

r***i3i
[*P23] The Osguthorpes argue the declaration
alone is insufficient as a matter of law to
establish that Smith had an interest in the
disputed property because Smith was required
to prove a conveyance, separate from the
dissolution agreement, by Osguthorpe to Smith
or their partnership that complied with the
statute of frauds.
[*P24]

To satisfy the statute of frauds, "all

II. Is the Reservation of a Share of the
Lease Payments an Unreasonable Restraint on
Alienation?
[*P25]
The Osguthorpes argue Smith's
reservation of an interest in the sale and lease
payments is void as an unreasonable restraint
on alienation. Smith responds the reservation of
a share of the lease payments is not a restraint
on alienation but is merely an agreed upon
method of splitting up the profits when the
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[*P27] "An indirect restraint on alienation
disputed property is leased. The reservation
arises
when an attempt is made to accomplish
provides in relevant part:
some
purpose other than the restraint of
In the event, however, that [Osguthorpe] or
alienability, but with the incidental result that
his successor or successors in interest, during
the
instrument, if valid, would restrain practical
the lifetime of the survivor of [Smith] and
alienability."
Redd, 646 P.2d at 764 (quotations
[Osguthorpe], plus twenty-one (21) years, in a
and citation omitted); see also Restatement
good faith transaction, shall sell the property,
(Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 3.5 (1998) ("An
or any part thereof at a price exceeding Twenty
otherwise
valid servitude is valid even if it
Dollars ($ 20.00) per acre, plus the depreciated
indirectly restrains alienation by limiting the
cost of any fencing that [Osguthorpe] may have
use
that can be made of the property, by
caused to be done on the property, then [Smith]
reducing the amount realizable by the owner on
shall share equally with [Osguthorpe] in the
sale or other transfer of the property, or by
sales price paid over Twenty Dollars ($ 20.00)
otherwise reducing the value of the property.").
per acre, plus said depreciated fencing cost, and
In Redd, the supreme court noted that an
if, during said period of time he, or his
indirect restraint will "generally [be] upheld
successor or successors in interest in the
and enforced ... if it is found reasonably
property shall lease all or any part of [***15]
necessary to protect a justifiable or legitimate
the property, for any period of [**860] time
interest of the parties." 646 P.2d at 764.
commencing during said retained interest
period, at a price in excess of $ 1.60 per acre
[*P28] The pivotal issue in the present case is
per year, [Smith] shall share equally in the
whether
the provision that Osguthorpe share
excess rental over the $ 1.60 per acre per year.
the lease payments with Smith restrains
practical alienability and thus is an indirect
[*P26] In Redd v. Western Savings & Loan
restraint on alienation. n6 Utah appellate courts
Co., 646 P.2d 761 (Utah 1982), the Utah
have not considered this issue. However,
Supreme Court recognized two types of
[***17] Holiday Out In America at St. Lucie,
restraints on alienation, direct and indirect. See
Inc. v. Bowes, 285 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
id. at 764 (citing Restatement of Property §
App. 1973), is instructive. In that case,
404 (1944)). A direct restraint
purchasers of condominium units brought an
action to void, as an unreasonable restraint, a
"is an attempt by an otherwise effective
condominium declaration provision that gave
conveyance or contract to cause a later
the developer the exclusive right to rent the
conveyance (a) to be void; or (b) to impose
condominium units to the general public when
contractual liability on the one who makes the
the same were not occupied by the owners. See
later conveyance when such liability results
id. at 64. The provision required the developer
from a breach of an agreement not to convey;
to remit fifty percent of the rent to the owners
or (c) to terminate or subject to termination all
to help pay for the units. See id. The Florida
or a part of the property interest conveyed."
Court of Appeals concluded there was no
restraint on alienation. See id. The court
Id. at 762 n.l (quoting Restatement of
explained, "that the property may be less
Property § 404). Traditionally, direct restraints
desirable (and hence less valuable) than would
have been held to be void. See Page v. Page,
be the case if not subject to the rental
15 Utah 2d 432, 394 P.2d 612, 613 (1964). We
restrictions ... simply does not constitute a
agree with the district court that the reservation
restraint on alienation." Id.
of a share of the lease payments is not a direct
restraint. [***16]
n6 The Osguthorpes rely on LaFond
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indirect restraint, we would conclude it can
v. Rumler, 226 Mich. App. 447, 574
[**861] be enforced. Significantly, Redd was
N.W.2d 40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); White
decided before section 3.5 of the Restatement
v. White, 105 N.J. Super. 184, 251 A.2d
(Third) of Property was adopted. Section 3.5
470 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1969);
drops the requirement that an indirect restraint
Dunlop v. Dunlop, 144 Va. 297,132 S.E.
be reasonable, requiring only a rational
351 (Va. 1926); and Girard v. Myers, 39
justification
for the restraint. See Restatement
Wn. App. 577, 694 P.2d 678 (Wash. Ct.
(Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 3.5 cmt. a. We
App. 1985). However, these cases
conclude under either the Redd reasonableness
address distinguishable provisions
test or the more modern rational justification
requiring grantees to share in proceeds
test, the reservation is not invalid.
upon the sale of property, traditionally
referred to as "quarter sales." The
[*P30] Kerley v. Nu-West, Inc., 158 Ariz.
"quarter sale" provision in the dissolution
344, 762 P.2d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), is
agreement is not at issue in the present
helpful. In that case, two landowners sold
case.
fifteen acres of their interest in a subdivision to
Moreover, although quarter sales
a developer, subject to a reservation of ten
traditionally have been considered void
percent of the gross sales price from the first
as unreasonable restraints on alienation,
sale of each improved parcel, and subject to a
see, e.g., United States v. 397.51 Acres
provision
requiring the developer to develop
of Land, 692 F.2d 688, 691-92 (10th Cir.
and
sell
the
land. 762 P.2d at 632-33. The
1982), the more modern view, according
reservation was a covenant running with the
to the Restatement (Third) of Property, is
land and was binding on successive owners
that quarter sales are valid indirect
until the amount due on the first sale was paid.
restraints on alienation even though they
See762 P.2d at 633. The sellers [***19] and
reduce "the amount realizable by the
developer
also agreed the sellers could
owner on sale or other transfer of
repurchase
the land that had not been
property, or by otherwise reducing the
developed or resold. See id. In considering
value of the property." Restatement
whether
the restraint was reasonable, the
(Third) of Prop.: Servitudes §
3.5
Arizona Court of Appeals considered whether:
(1998). This is because "modern
financing practices have led to
"1. the one imposing the restraint has some
acceptance of arrangements in which
interest in the land which he is seeking to
land buyers agree to share future
protect by the enforcement of the restraint; 2.
appreciation with both sellers and
the restraint is limited in duration; 3. the
lenders. Under [section 3.5 of the
enforcement of the restraint accomplishes a
Restatement (Third) of Property], these
worthwhile purpose; 4. the type of conveyances
arrangements are not invalid if there is
prohibited are ones not likely to be employed to
some rational justification for requiring
any substantial degree by the one restrained; 5.
the grantee to share the proceeds with
the number of persons to whom alienation is
another." Id. § 3.5 cmt. c.
prohibited is small; 6. the one upon whom the
restraint is imposed is a charity."
[***18]
[*P29] Even if we were to hold the rent
sharing provision in the present case is an

762 P.2d at 634 (quoting Restatement of
Property § 406 cmt. i (1944)).
[*P31] In upholding the restraint, the Arizona
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operations.
Court of Appeals noted the sellers retained an
interest in the adjoining land. See 762 P.2d at
[*P34] The dissolution agreement provides:
635. The court then emphasized the "whole
purpose of the agreement was to develop and
So long as [Osguthorpe] shall use said real
sell land—the very antithesis of the purpose of
property as grazing lands in connection with
those practices that gave rise to statutes and
his operation of a sheep or cattle business,
decisions [traditionally] forbidding quarter
[Osguthorpe] shall have the right to the
sales and unreasonable restraints [***20] on
possession and use of the property without
alienation." Id. The court further emphasized
compensation to [Smith], but he shall pay the
the developer knew when he bargained for the
taxes and any expense of maintaining the
agreement that he had to project his profit or
property. In the event, however, that
loss plus the ten percent reservation on the
[Osguthorpe] or his successor [**862] or
price of the property. See id. The court also
successors in interest ... shall lease all or any
emphasized that although "as written, the
part of the property, for any period of time
obligation to pay money [was] unlimited as to
commencing during said retained interest
time ... the law ... implied that it [would] be
period, at a price in excess of $ 1.60 per acre
carried out within a reasonable time." Id. Thus,
per year, [Smith] shall share equally in the
although the power to trigger the obligation to
excess rental over the $ 1.60 per acre per year.
pay the ten percent was within the developer's
control, if the sellers took no legal action to see
(Emphasis added.)
that the spirit of the agreement was enforced,
"laches [might] foreclose [their] right to receive
[*P35] [***22] The Osguthorpes allege that
the ten percent payment" upon resale. 762 P.2d
Smith's counsel assured Osguthorpe that the
at 636.
dissolution agreement would only require him
to share lease payments if he ceased using the
[*P32] In the present case, Enoch Richard
property for grazing. We agree with the district
Smith alleges his father's justification for the
court that the Osguthorpes' allegation is
reservation was to allow him to participate in
contrary to the unambiguous plain language of
the disputed property's future increase in value.
the agreement and that Smith is entitled to
Further, the record shows the reservation did
share in the lease payments even though the
not prevent alienation twice—to the family
Osguthorpes continue to use part of the
partnership and to the Canyons. In fact, the
disputed property for grazing.
Osguthorpes leased the property for twentyeight years and it has been improved. Thus, we
IV. Does the Dissolution Agreement Entitle
conclude the reservation of a share of [***21]
Smith to Share in the Lease Payments?
the lease payments is enforceable.
III. Does the Dissolution Agreement Entitle
Smith to Share in the Lease Payments
Although the Osguthorpes Use Portions of the
Disputed Property for Grazing?
[*P33] The Osguthorpes assert the dissolution
agreement provides that they do not have to
share the lease payments with Smith so long as
they use the disputed property for grazing in
connection with their sheep and cattle

[*P36] The Osguthorpes argue that because
the lease does not grant the Canyons an
exclusive right of possession, Smith is not
entitled to share in the lease payments under
the dissolution agreement. They maintain the
lease grants a nonexclusive easement because
they retain the right to possess, improve, and
control the property.
[*P37] The dissolution agreement provides
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that Smith is entitled to share in lease payments
if the Osguthorpes lease "any part" of the
disputed property. The district court ruled the
lease was for a leasehold interest. The court
emphasized that the lease is titled "Lease
Agreement" and identifies the Osguthorpes
[***23] as the lessors and the Canyons as the
lessee. The court further emphasized that the
lease requires the Canyons to pay "rent." Thus,
the court ruled the dissolution agreement
requires the Osguthorpes to share the lease
payments. The Osguthorpes argue the district
court elevated form over substance in focusing
on the nomenclature "lease."
[*P38] "A lease conveys an interest in land
and transfers possession." Keller v. Southwood
N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 107
(Utah 1998) (quotations and citation omitted).
While a leasehold transfers exclusive
possession, see id., an easement is also an
interest in land of another, although for a
particular purpose, see Warburton v. Virginia
Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779,
781 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Crane v.
Crane, 683 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Utah 1984)
(recognizing commercial easements in gross as
alienable property interests). We conclude the
district court properly considered the lease
language, although it is not determinative. We
further conclude the dissolution agreement
allows Smith to share in the lease payments,
even if the Canyons' interest is an easement,
[***24] as the dissolution agreement entitles
Smith to share in the lease payments if the
Osguthorpes lease "any part" of the disputed
property and the agreement is silent as to
exclusive possession. n7
n7 The Osguthorpes also argue the
lease grants only a license to the
Canyons. A license "is the permission or
authority to engage in a particular act or
series of acts upon the land of another
without possessing an interest therein."
Keller v. Southwood N. Med. Pavilion,
Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1998)

App. LEXIS 110, ***

(quotations and citation omitted). The
lease grants the Canyons the right to
specific portions of the disputed property
and it does so for twenty-eight years at a
fixed annual rent. Although the
Osguthorpes retain the right to improve
the disputed property, they could not,
under the original lease or first
amendment, interfere with the Canyons'
operations and cannot, under the second
amendment, unreasonably interfere with
the Canyons' winter operations. Thus, the
district
court
appropriately
acknowledged the Canyons has
possession rights under the lease.
Moreover, the lease allows the Canyons
to make certain improvements to the
property and the Canyons has in fact
constructed and maintained ski lifts,
roads, trails, and facilities on the
property. Given that the Canyons has the
right to run its operations with limited
interference and to construct roads and
trails, the tenancy term, and the fixed
annual rent under the lease, we conclude
the lease involves more than "permission
or authority to engage in a particular act
or series of acts upon the land." Id.
[***25]
V. Do Issues of Material Fact in Regard to
Allocation of the Lease Payments Preclude
Summary Judgment on Damages?
[*P39] The Osguthorpes maintain the district
court erred in ruling that the entire payment
due under the lease and the amendments is for
use of the disputed property because the
[**863] lease parties' deposition testimony and
affidavits establish that the majority of the
lease payment is for Stephen Osguthorpe's
(Stephen) personal services.
[*P40] The district court ruled the lease and
the amendments are integrated. However, it is
unclear from the district court's ruling whether
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communications."
the court considered the parol evidence offered
by the Osguthorpes in so ruling. The court also
[*P43] The Osguthorpes offered affidavits
ruled that any "side oral agreement" for
and deposition testimony that Osguthorpe and
services by Stephen violated the statute of
Stephen met with the Canyons after it
frauds.
succeeded to Wolf Mountain's interest in the
lease. The Osguthorpes and the Canyons
[*P41] In first determining whether the lease
allegedly orally agreed that Stephen would
and the amendments are integrated, the district
assist
the Canyons with obtaining permits and
court was required to consider "parol evidence,
with the development of the disputed property.
indeed any relevant evidence," Union Bank v.
The Osguthorpes also offered two checks from
Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985)
the Canyons for the annual lease payment. The
(emphasis added), "showing the circumstances
1999 check listed Stephen as the payee.
under which [they were] made and the purpose
for which the instruments [were] executed." Eie
v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190, 1194
[*P44] In his deposition, Blaise Carrig
(Utah 1981) [***26] (quotations and citation
(Carrig), the Canyons' director, testified that
omitted). However, to preserve the integrity of
because of time constraints and the parties'
written contracts, our courts "presume that a
relationship, the first amendment was brief and
writing which on its face appears to be an
does not include a detailed description of the
integrated agreement is what it appears to be."
personal services. Carrig further testified that
Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 664; see also Terry's
use of the property was worthless without the
Sales, Inc. v. Vander Veur II, 618 P.2d 29, 32
Osguthorpes' support in obtaining permits and
(Utah 1980) ("Where parties have various
"consultation to make the whole operation and
claims and obligations to each other, and have
planning ... work." Carrig also testified that the
had a discussion about resolving their disputes
lease [***28] amendment language that the
which results in a written agreement signed by
Canyons and the Osguthorpes agree to "work
them, it is generally to be assumed that their
together in good faith" and "maintain open
disputes were merged into the written
communications" establishes that part of the
agreement."). Further, a district court is not
lease payment is for services.
precluded from ruling that a contract is
integrated in granting a motion for summary
[*P45] We cannot determine from the record
judgment. If the "contract terms are complete,
whether the district court considered the
clear, and unambiguous [, they can] be
offered parol evidence to determine as a
threshold matter whether the lease and the
interpreted by the judge on a motion for
amendments are an integrated agreement. See
summary judgment." Webb v. R.O.A. Gen.,
Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v.
Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
Larsen
Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483, 486
(quotations and citation omitted).
(Utah 1986) ("Because the parol evidence rule
applies only if the writing was intended by the
[*P42] The initial lease makes no reference to
parties
to represent the full and complete
services, nor does it include any language that
agreement of the parties, the [district] court
even ambiguously alludes to services. The first
must first determine whether the writing was
amendment provides that Stephen is to approve
intended to be an integrated agreement."). We
[***27] construction of certain roads and trails
also cannot say as we did with the dissolution
and the Canyons "will include the Osguthorpes
agreement that the terms of the informal lease
in their master planning process." It also
and amendments are "complete, clear, and
provides the lease parties are to "work together
unambiguous."
We conclude the parol evidence
in good faith" and "maintain open
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must ultimately hear testimony to determine if
offered by the Osguthorpes was relevant to
there is a valid, enforceable agreement—e.g.,
whether the lease and the amendments
which is not barred by the statute of frauds and
constitute an integrated agreement. We also
which is not unenforceable for lack of
conclude that if [**864] the district court
definiteness~to apply part of the annual lease
determines after considering this parol
payments
as payment for personal services. If
evidence that the lease [***29] and the
such an agreement exists, the court should also
amendments are not an integrated agreement,
determine what portion of the lease payments is
then there is a material issue of fact as to
for use of the disputed property, determine
damages. We therefore remand for the court to
what portion is for services, and establish
consider the parol evidence or to make clear
damages based thereon.
that it considered the parol evidence in ruling
that the lease and the amendments are
VI. Did the District Court Err by not
integrated. If the court did not consider the
Ordering Joinder of Stephen and the Canyons?
parol evidence, the court must consider such
evidence to determine whether the lease and
[*P47] In essence, the [***31] Osguthorpes
the amendments are an integrated agreement to
argue
the district court erred by inviting, rattier
pay exclusively for the use of the disputed
than
ordering,
joinder of Stephen and the
property or whether the lease parties also have
Canyons because they are indispensable
an agreement for services and the appropriate
parties.
Under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of
allocation of damages.
Civil Procedure, a party must be joined if that
party is necessary and it is feasible to join that
[*P46] On remand the district court should
party. See Utah R. Civ. P. 19. "The underlying
make clear it considered the parol evidence in
purpose of rule 19 requiring joinder of
ruling the lease and the amendments are
necessary parties is '"to protect the interests of
integrated or it should take evidence to
absent persons as well as those already before
determine if the lease and the amendments are
the
court from multiple litigation or
integrated. The district court should determine
inconsistent
judicial determinations.'"" Grand
based on the lease and the amendment terms,
County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, P28, 44 P.3d
testimony of the parties to the lease and the
734 (quoting Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795
amendments, and the circumstances
P.2d
1127, 1130 (Utah 1990)) (other citation
surrounding their execution if they are
omitted).
integrated. Even if the evidence offered on
remand "is uncontroverted, [the district] court
is free to disregard such [evidence] if it finds
[*P48] "Under rule 19, the [district] court
[***30] the evidence 'self-serving and not
must first determine whether a party is
credible."' Glauser Storage, L.L.C., v. Smedley,
necessary." 2002 UT 25 at P29. A party is
2001 UT App 141, P24, 27 P.3d 565. Thus, we
necessary if:
note that even if the parties' testimony is
"(1) in his absence complete relief cannot
uncontroverted, the court may determine under
be accorded among those already parties, or (2)
the circumstances the lease and the
he claims an interest relating to the subject of
amendments are integrated, cf.
Webb, 804
the action and is so situated that the disposition
P.2d at 551, and that the lease payments are for
of the action in his absence may (I) as a
use of the disputed property not for services. If
practical matter impair or impede his ability to
the court determines the lease and the
protect that interest or (ii) [***32] leave any
amendments are not integrated, then summary
of the persons already parties subject to a
judgment would not be appropriate as there
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple,
would be disputed issues of fact. The court then
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason
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of his claimed interest."
2002 UT 25 at P28 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P.
19(a)). If the court concludes a party is
necessary, "the court must next consider
whether joinder of the necessary party is
feasible." 2002 UT 25 at P29. If joinder is
feasible, the necessary party '"shall be joined.'"
Id. (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)).
[*P49] The district court concluded that
although Stephen and the Canyons did not have
an interest in Smith's action generally, they did
have an interest in the court's ruling that the
lease payments were for use of the disputed
property not for personal [**865] services.
The court then invited Stephen and the
Canyons to file memoranda in opposition to
Smith's motion for summary judgment in
regard to damages. Stephen filed a
memorandum in opposition and an affidavit.
The Canyons declined to do the same.
[*P50] In their opening brief, the Osguthorpes
fail to discuss specific facts showing how
Stephen or the Canyons, "based on the criteria
set forth in rule 19(a), [are] necessary parties to
this action. [***33] " Green v. Louder, 2001
UT 62, P44, 29 P.3d 638. Nor do they explain
why the authorities they cite compel this court
to reverse the district court.
[*P51] "Without more, delay is not a proper
reason to deny joinder under rule 19." LePet,
Inc. v. Mower, 872 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994). However, in this case, Stephen
was a party to the litigation as a member of the
family partnership; yet, Osguthorpe and the
family partnership did not seek joinder until
after Smith's motion for summary judgment on
damages had been granted. We also disagree
that Stephen's ability to protect his interest is
impaired. In his affidavit, he attested that
Osguthorpe allocates the lease payments. There
is no evidence that he has not received any
payment due him, although the record includes
a letter to the Canyons indicating Stephen will

no longer perform services.
[*P52] Further, rule 19 allows joinder where
there is a "substantial risk" of inconsistent
obligations. Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a). Here,
according to Stephen's affidavit, Osguthorpe
allocates the lease payments. Arguably,
Stephen's interest and the Canyons' interest in
the district court's ruling [***34] in regard to
the lease payments are identical—they both
share a concern that services are a significant
part of the lease payments. Although the
Canyons is not bound by the district court's
decision, it seems likely that an action by the
Canyons against Stephen for services would be
unsuccessful. Cf.
Boczon v. Northwestern
Elevator Co., 652 F. Supp. 1482, 1486 (E.D.
Wis. 1987) (recognizing "no substantial risk of
incurring inconsistent obligations exists where
there is only a risk of a frivolous lawsuit, or
where the absent party has no cause of action
against parties already named" (citation
omitted)). Thus, we cannot say the district
court erred in not ordering joinder of Stephen
and the Canyons in the first proceeding.
However, we note the issues presented in
regard to the integration of the lease and
damages on remand may well require a
different result.
CONCLUSION
[*P53]
We conclude the dissolution
agreement is integrated and enforceable. We
further conclude Smith is entitled to share in
the lease payments even though the
Osguthorpes still use the disputed property for
grazing and the Canyons' possession of the
same may not be exclusive. However, the
[***35] district court was required to consider
extrinsic evidence in determining as a threshold
matter whether the lease and the amendments
are integrated. We therefore reverse in part and
remand for consideration of this evidence and
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judith M. Billings,
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Associate Presiding Judge
[*P54] WE CONCUR:

Presiding Judge
William A. Thome Jr., Judge

Norman H. Jackson,

